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In 2008 Russia surprised the West by going to war with Georgia.  While several 
analyses have pointed to separate actions by NATO and the West as having influenced 
the 2008 war, this paper endeavors to show that the combined actions of the West and 
NATO since the fall of the Soviet Union created a security dilemma for Russia.  Because 
the West refused to properly acknowledge and address Russia’s dilemma, the West 
inadvertently created the conditions which led to the culmination of Russia’s security 
dilemma in the form of an invasion of Georgia.  Russia’s war with Georgia was less an 
attempt to protect Russian citizens and prevent atrocities as it was a rebuttal of Western 
actions.  This thesis examines the security dilemma and cooperation theories as presented 
by Dr. Robert Jervis, and looks specifically at Western-Russian relations relating to three 
spheres: NATO expansion and Western marginalization of Russia, Western unilateral and 
extra-U.N. military aggression, and Western anti-ballistic missile defense initiatives and 
programs.  Western actions relating to these three spheres created the conditions for the 
war, and specifics within the Caucasus region and relating to separatist conflicts drove 
 vii 
Russia to deem a war with Georgia a politically safe rebuttal to the West.  This paper also 
examines continued Western refusal to acknowledge Russia’s dilemma and developing 
conditions, as they relate to the three spheres of NATO expansion, unilateral military 
action and missile defenses, which could potentially lead to further conflict between 
Russia and the West. 
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“The Russia-Georgia crisis therefore has become an indicator of a bigger Russia-
West crisis.” Andrei Tsygankov (2009, p. 318) 
 
In August of 2008, Russia shocked the world by suddenly invading its smaller 
neighbor, Georgia.  Russia insisted that its invasion was a reactive measure, taken to 
bolster Russian peacekeepers and protect Russian citizens against a Georgian offensive. 
Georgia insisted that Russia had preemptively invaded with the goal of destroying 
Georgian President Michael Saakashvili’s regime.  The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the United States (collectively, the 
West1) pronounced horrification and outrage as Russia embarked on a military campaign 
aimed seemingly to alter set geopolitical borders – an act which was supposed to have 
been abandoned with the Cold War; however, the shock and outrage displayed by the 
West were extraordinary.  
Russia had been giving clues for over 10 years that an incident such as this could 
happen if the West continued policies which Russia perceived as existentially 
threatening. As Russia saw it, an increasingly self-centered and self-righteous West had 
been progressively attempting to relegate Russia, the former center of the Soviet Union 
and arguably one of the world’s strongest military powers, to the status of a banana 
republic.  Moscow had tried diplomacy, cooperation, and political warnings to let the 
West understand that the Kremlin expected to be treated as equal by the West.  When 
such warnings failed, Russia took action to demonstrate its rightful standing and position 
in the post Cold War world.  Despite such action, the West and Russia continue to face 
off over several political hotspots in the Caucasus, Syria and Europe; the security 
                                                 
1 As a note of clarification, the term “West” is applied in this thesis to refer to the United States, NATO and 




dilemma facing Russia has not diminished despite relations “resets” and attempts at 
placation.  If the West is to avoid future direct or indirect conflict with Russia, it must 
learn the lessons of how it created the conditions which led Russia to invade Georgia, and 
how the West can avoid creating the same conditions again.   
 The primary premise of this thesis is that the West, by its actions beginning as 
early as the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 through the summer of 2008, created 
a security dilemma for Russia which set in place the conditions which led to the August, 
2008, Russo-Georgian war. Western actions and conditions can be broadly grouped into 
three main areas: NATO expansion and Russia’s marginalization; unilateral or extra-U.N. 
offensive military action; and missile defense issues. Under the conditions of Russia’s 
security dilemma, Russia felt it could no longer continue on a path of cooperation with 
what it viewed as an increasingly hostile West – specifically NATO.  Moscow felt that 
diplomacy and verbal warnings regarding NATO’s actions against Russian interests were 
no longer being taken seriously and, therefore, Russia had to send a stronger message. 
This message came in the form of military action against Georgia. Further, this thesis 
argues that because of a failure to recognize the conditions of Russia’s security dilemma 
and the connection of these conditions to the cause of the War, the West continues to act 
in a way that is aggravating Russia’s security dilemma and creating conditions for future 
conflict between Russia and the West.   
This master’s thesis is divided into five chapters and focuses on the specific 
actions and conditions which led to the 2008 War. The first chapter focuses on an 
explanation of cooperation under the security dilemma as described by Dr. Robert Jervis, 
the nature of game theory as it relates to international relations, and briefly relates these 
theories to Russian-Western relations of the period. The second chapter focuses on 




chapter focuses on extra-U.N. and unilateral military action by the West with a specific 
focus on NATO action in Kosovo.  This chapter will also look at how NATO elevated 
itself to equal authority with the U.N. Security Council for international military action, 
and how NATO action in Kosovo set a precedent for the support of separatist groups over 
territorial integrity.  The fourth chapter focuses on the West’s development of anti-
ballistic missile defense systems (ABMDS, BMDS or ABMS) across the world and the 
effect of those developments on Russia’s security and nuclear deterrent.  The fifth chapter 
examines the 2008 War as the culmination of Russia’s security dilemma, including a 
brief history of Russian-Georgian relations, the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and the events which led directly to the War.  This chapter also looks at 
evidences that the War was directed at the West and NATO specifically.  It must be noted 
that while this thesis argues that the War is the culmination of the actions and conditions 
examined, the War itself is not the primary focus.  In its conclusion, those areas and 
issues which are setting conditions for future conflict between Russia and the West are 
examined within the framework of Russia’s security dilemma as caused by the West, 
specifically NATO expansion, unilateral military action and missile defenses. 
 The histories involved in Russia-Georgian relations and Russia-Western relations 
are long and complicated.  This paper does not endeavor to give the reader a detailed 
history of Russia’s relations with the West and in the Caucasus, but will only provide a 
brief history as determined pertinent by the author.  While this paper strives to argue 
NATO’s overarching and underlying responsibility for the conditions which led to the 
War, it will not focus on placing blame for the invasion of Georgia on NATO, only blame 
for the conditions which led to the invasion.  Russia, as an independent and sovereign 
nation, is more than capable of making its own decisions. Numerous outside geopolitical 




foot down.  While it is possible to envision different possible Russian courses of action to 






Chapter 1: International Relations and the Security Dilemma 
In 1978 Robert Jervis wrote an article published in the journal World Politics 
titled “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”.  In this influential article, Jervis 
presented an analysis of the security dilemma as it pertained to international relations and 
why states act as they do.   He also offered a refined view of international relations and 
politics based on the theories of cooperation presented in Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt” (167) 
and Rappaport and Chammah’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (171), as well as an application of 
offense-defense theory.  While there are critics of the security dilemma and the role of 
offense-defense theory, Jervis’ analysis proved the most suited for this thesis (Lynn-
James, 1995). 
Jervis lays out the justifications for larger or “sovereign” states to interfere in both 
the domestic and foreign policies of smaller neighbors: first, to protect critical physical 
assets or possessions present in both the sovereign as well as the smaller nation; and, 
second, to provide both a physical and ideological buffer against attack from other large 
or sovereign nations (1978; Lynn-Jones, 1995).  Jervis explained that larger sovereign 
nations will manifest this interference on a range of issues, and will feel compelled not to 
accept compromise for fear that to do so would “be taken as weakness and invite 
predation” from other large states (169).  Jervis quotes Klemens von Metternich, who 
stated in pertinent part that “any false or pernicious step taken by any state in its internal 
affairs may disturb the repose of another state, and this consequent disturbance of another 
state’s repose constitutes interference in that state’s internal affairs” (169).  Because one 
state’s poor or “pernicious” internal decisions and actions can create insecurity in 
neighboring or competing states, Metternich argued:  
 
Every state – or rather every sovereign of a great power – has the duty, in the 




governments of smaller states and to prevent them from taking false and 
pernicious steps in their internal affairs (Cited in Jervis, 1978, 169). 
Jervis then raises the issue of the security dilemma, which ties the security efforts 
of one state to the perceived insecurity of other states.  As the theory goes, suppose two 
neighbors are at odds over some small item of disagreement, but despite lingering 
animosity, the disagreement has never gone beyond harsh words and threatening 
postures.  One day, Neighbor One brings home a baseball bat, having heard rumor that 
bandits were roaming the neighborhood.  Neighbor Two sees Neighbor One take the bat 
inside, and, concerned that the bat is intended for him, decides to acquire a large knife to 
even out the situation.  Neighbor One sees Two’s large knife and becomes concerned that 
the neighborhood banditry is more rampant than he’d thought, and brings home an even 
bigger knife.  Neighbor Two responds by bringing home a handgun, to which One brings 
home a rifle, and the “arms race” continues, founded not on an understanding of mutual 
threat, but rather on the perception of insecurity.  According to Jervis, “in international 
politics, one state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others” (170) and 
consequently “states underestimate the degree to which they menace others” (200).  
Much of the “dilemma” is that states tend to make decisions based not on logical and 
realistic assessments, but instead on perceived insecurity.  The steps taken by one state to 
increase its own security often inculcate in neighboring or competing states a greater 
sense of insecurity.  Whether or not this insecurity is real or perceived, it has the same 
general effect.  Jervis states that “decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability that 






Figure 1: Game theory matrices for “Stag Hunt” and “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. 
Using game theory matrices shown in Figure 1, Jervis lays out the possible 
choices for actors: to cooperate (C); and to defect (D). In any given situation, an actor or 
state can make one of two choices, with the most mutually desirable being, generally,  
mutual cooperation (CC or cooperation-cooperation), and the least mutually desirable, 
generally, being mutual non-cooperation (defection-defection DD), which in the case of 
nation-states often equates to war. There are four possibilities within this model, the first 
being CC, as just described, generally equating to “international cooperation and 
disarmament”. The second possibility is CD, or cooperation-defection, generally equating 
to “being disarmed while others are arming”. The third possibility is DC, or defection-
cooperation, generally equating to “maintaining a high level of arms while others are 
disarming”. The fourth option, as described earlier, is DD, generally equating to “arms 
competition and high risk of war” (167). Further adapting the game theory matrices 
presented in Figure 1, Jervis combined them to a single matrix for the security dilemma 




relative advantage provided by either an offensive or defensive security posture2.  Jervis 
referred to each possible combination as a “world” (211).   
 
 
Figure 2: Jervis’ game theory matrix for the security dilemma. 
The first possible world is one where an offensive posture is indistinguishable 
from a defensive posture, but offensive action has an advantage. This world is “doubly 
dangerous” for states as offensive action, or Defection, is preferable to deprive 
competitor states of the opportunity for offense, causing states to “behave like 
aggressors” to protect their interests. The security dilemma operates most strongly in this 
first world, and will generally result in a DD scenario.   
The second possible world is one where the posture remains indistinguishable, but 
the defense has the advantage.   The security dilemma continues to operate, though not as 
strongly, with “increments in one side’s strength increasing its security more than they 
decrease the other’s” (212).  Because states cannot determine a competitor’s motives 
                                                 
2 For additional discussion regarding offense-defense theory, see Sean Lynn-James’ Offense-Defense 




based on posture, combined with the advantage of the defense, aggression would “create 
needless conflict” (212) and states would be more likely to use diplomacy to resolve 
conflicts.  While this world has inherent stability, Jervis points out that it is realistically 
infeasible, as “purely defensive postures are rarely possible because fortifications are 
usually supplemented by armies and mobile guns which can support an attack” (213).   
The third possible world is one in which offensive and defensive postures are 
easily distinguishable, but the offense has the advantage.  In this world the security 
dilemma is almost non-existent as states “can procure defensive systems that do not 
threaten others”, but because of the advantage given to the offense, “aggression is 
possible, and perhaps easy” (213).  Because of the ease of aggression, this third world has 
a greater degree of inherent instability and potential for conflict, though warning signs 
would be relatively easy to identify for states in defensive postures.   
The fourth world is one in which states are given an escape from the security 
dilemma, and is considered by Jervis as “doubly safe” (214). In this world postures are 
easily distinguishable and the defense has the advantage. This scenario provides “no 
reason for a power to be tempted to procure offensive forces, and aggressors give notice 
of their intentions by the posture they adopt” (214). This world would see a much greater 
use of diplomatic and “nonmilitary” approaches to resolving conflict. A combination of 
these four worlds and the four cooperation-defection possibilities comprise the structure 
against which this paper’s arguments are framed. The various actions taken by NATO 
and Russia are examined as examples of cooperation and defection. 
During over 50 years of Cold War stagnation, the Soviet Union and NATO 
became what Jervis refers to as “Status Quo” entities, states that are satisfied with the 
current state of relations and tenability of defense versus offense. At the end of the Cold 




conventional armies and arsenals, and a relative defensive and offensive match in 
unconventional or nuclear arsenals.  As Jervis asserts, “it takes great effort for any one 
state to be able to protect itself alone against an attack by several neighbors” (176), and 
“the greater the reason for it to join a larger and more secure unit” (172). The Soviet 
Union’s Warsaw Pact and the West’s NATO were created as competing entities to 
provide mutual defense against the other3 (Jervis, 1978; Lynn-Jones, 1995). Under the 
Cold War rules of engagement, the differences between offensive posturing and 
defensive posture were only mildly distinguishable conventionally, and completely 
indistinguishable regarding nuclear forces (Jervis, 1978; Lynn-Jones, 1995).  The 
defense, however, held the advantage both conventionally and unconventionally, and the 
two entities found themselves in an example of Jervis’ second world, allowing for the use 
of diplomatic posturing and statesmanship to resolve most conflict.  The difficult nature 
of distinguishing between offensive and defensive posturing, however, created the 
greatest dilemma following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO remained as an intact 
organization. While the Soviet counterbalance of the Warsaw Pact no longer remained, 
the newly emerged Russian Federation continued to view the world through status-quo 
power eyes, and anticipated that NATO would do the same. Through, and even despite, 
the creation of organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, on the one hand, 
viewed regional politics throughout the sphere of the former Soviet Union as remaining 
the purview of the Russian Federation. NATO, on the other hand, fell prey to the 
decidedly non-status-quo attitudes of the United States and despite airs and promises of a 
                                                 
3 Sean Lynn-Jones refers to the creation of alliances as “bandwagoning”. (1995, 669)  For further 
discussion on the security dilemma’s role in the forming of alliances, see Glenn Snyder’s The Security 




status-quo attitude, NATO displayed behavior much more inclined towards an 
ideological aggressor. 
These conditions, with NATO and the West acting as a non-status quo aggressor 
state, and Russia, attempting to remain a status-quo competitor power, are the conditions 
which have developed over the years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 
conditions for cooperation and defection from each side are examined in relation to each 





Chapter 2: NATO Expansion and the Marginalization of Russia 
“Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people’s 
homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas.  It also means the 
maintenance of the world’s respect for them, the maintenance of their economic 
interests, everything in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, 
of the nation.” (Jules-Martin Cambon, quoted in Jervis, 1978, 185) 
While Russia and the West have never truly enjoyed friendly, productive 
relations, there have been periods when relations were calm and trended towards 
openness and cooperation.  When the Soviet Union fell, many in both the West and 
Russia had hopes that as borders opened, so would relations, heralding friendship.   The 
West was ready to embrace what it hoped would be a new and democratic Russia, 
following in the paths of the free world.  Europe and NATO suddenly saw that without 
the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union, matters of European security were now entirely 
outside NATO’s boundaries (Solomon, 1998; Barany, 2003).  Even more, the Warsaw 
Pact was gone and the Russian military no longer threatened European security, and as 
evidenced in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, Russia was militarily only a shell of its former 
self.  Russia found itself being pushed aside by the West, categorized as simply a nuclear-
armed former Soviet republic, and having condescending lessons in democracy dictated 
to it.  The practical dismissal of Russia by the West is first among the three major issues 
discussed in this paper which led to Russia’s invasion of Georgia, and a large part of the 
foundation of Russian relations with the West.  
 This chapter looks at Russian expectations for post-Soviet relations, NATO 
expansion and political misuse of Russia by the West.  It examines Russian attitudes 
towards NATO and the West, and the attitudes and opinions of Western leaders in 
regards to Russia.  Finally, it examines Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2007 address 
to Western leaders in Munich, which plainly outlined Russia’s perception of offenses by 




WHAT RUSSIA EXPECTED 
Immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself the 
heir of a former empire, in both assets and political expectations.  The Soviet Union had 
enjoyed its place as one of two superpowers in a bipolar world.  Status as one of two 
superpowers provided a measure of stability for politicians in Moscow; but when that 
status was lost, along with hegemonic control over the region, Russia began to struggle to 
find its proper place in world politics.  Author Bobo Lo argues that this struggle rested on 
the ideas of what Russia meant as a nation, nationally, regionally and ethnically, and 
whether or not Russia continued to constitute a great power state following the Soviet 
Union (2002; 2003).  With a combination of ethnic and national roots across Eurasia and 
a decidedly imperial history, Russia “by virtue of its imperial past and identity, simply 
does not have the option of becoming a nation-state like others” (Lo, 2002, 21).  In the 
words of Richard Sakwa, “Russia exercised the attributes of a world power, with a 
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and the second largest nuclear 
arsenal, but its weakened economic status opened up a contradiction between aspiration 
and capacity” (2008, 242).  The post-Soviet Russia would, in the eyes of the Kremlin and 
the Russian people, remain a world power and retain the regional influence Russia had 
enjoyed as the mainstay of the Soviet Union.  Still, the Soviet Union no longer existed, 
and neither did the Warsaw Pact – Russia’s military alliance countering the Western 
NATO.  Though Russia wanted many things to remain as they had been, Moscow 
recognized the changing nature of regional and world politics.  As the United States and 
the Soviet Union had once stood as polar superpowers, Russia now saw the future as 
multi-polar, with a diminished role for the United States as well.  As the Warsaw Pact 




dissolve as the Warsaw Pact had (Rasmussen, 2009).  NATO did not dissolve, but instead 
sought cooperation with the newly democratically-oriented, former Soviet republics.   
Russia’s expectations for continued global political clout faced several significant 
hurdles. First, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia faced “one of the greatest 
economic depressions in peacetime in modern world history” (Sakwa, 2008, 242), and 
lacking a viable economy, Russia’s political power was dramatically reduced. Second, 
Russia faced its own internal political upheaval. Boris Yeltsin’s ascension to the 
presidency was not fully solidified until after 1993’s violent military coup attempts, and 
then democracy passed more to superpresidentialism4, and Russian politics remained 
turbulent until the sudden rise of Vladimir Putin. Third, much of the Soviet Union’s clout 
in international politics came because of its vast military power, with one of the two 
largest nuclear arsenals in the world, and a conventional military to match. With the 
Russian military suffering from the same general economic disarray combined with 
humiliating performance during the first Chechen War, Russia’s military was no longer 
the object of Western fears. Despite Russia’s ambitions, “during the 1990s the gap 
between Russian expectations and realities widened at an alarming rate” (Lo, 2003, 14). 
The West, on the other hand, had just finished a successful 100-hour campaign to 
evict Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait and Southern Iraq, and was seeing a high 
level of military modernization. Western economies were growing and showing the 
promise of continued improvements in standard of living. Finally, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the reorientation of many former Soviet states toward the West had a 
unifying effect on Western political systems and philosophies. The West saw the post-
                                                 
4 Zoltan Barany defines superpresidentialism as a “fundamentally authoritarian state in which the president 




Soviet period as a time for spreading its own brand of liberal, secularist democracy and 
cooperation throughout Europe and possibly beyond. 
NATO EXPANSION AND MARGINALIZATION OF RUSSIA 
Immediately following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, NATO began making 
efforts toward communication and cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact, and 
established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at the end of 1991 based on the 
“common assumption that cooperation was the most effective means ‘to win the peace’ 
and to ensure stability and order in the post-Cold War geo-strategic space” (Kipp, 2009, 
55). The prospect of greater cooperation and communication between former enemies 
was a positive move, though there was an implicit expectation from Russian leadership 
that regardless of cooperation, NATO would not expand, especially into the former 
Soviet Bloc (Barany, 2003; Malevich, 2010). NATO, on the other hand, recognized that 
the major European issues facing the alliance existed outside NATO’s existing borders, 
and that resolution of post-Soviet European issues would require opening NATO’s doors. 
To answer Russia’s concerns over the prospect of NATO expansion, Western leaders 
made attempts to convince Russia that Eastward expansion of NATO was beneficial for 
both Russia and NATO. Expansion, the West argued, would “stabilize a historically 
volatile region” (Barany, 2003, 15), and would therefore bring greater stability to Russia 
itself. Some in the West also anticipated that NATO expansion would have a bolstering 
effect on liberal democratic factions within the new Russian government, despite 
evidence that “NATO enlargement, an issue that even the most pro-Western Russian 
politicians vocally opposed, was scarcely conducive to the promotion of Russian 




The promise of stability in the near-abroad failed to assuage Russia’s fears that 
NATO expansion was directed at Russia itself, especially given the attitudes exhibited by 
some of NATO’s proponents, who viewed NATO expansion as a form of insurance 
against a future Russian aggressor (Barany, 2003). NATO expansion soon took on the 
character of a plot to ensure Russia remained inconsequential on the world stage. As 
NATO began stepping up air operations in the Balkans, Russia’s Boris Yeltsin lamented 
that “’forces abroad’ wanted to keep Russia in a state of ‘controllable paralysis’” (Cited 
in Sherr, 2009, 285). The more nationalist and extreme elements of the Russian 
government were very vocal in their opposition to NATO enlargement. Russian general 
Aleksander Lebed flamed the anti-NATO fires among the security apparatuses by stating 
that NATO expansion would lead to “World War III”, and that Russia was taking secret 
military measures to ensure NATO did not succeed (Cited in Solomon, 1998, 80). Even 
some prominent Westerners were not sold on the benefits of NATO enlargement. 
Speaking to the U.S. Senate, Senator Sam Nunn asked the question: 
 
Are we really going to be able to convince the East Europeans that we are 
protecting them from their historical threats, while we convince the Russians that 
NATO’s enlargement has nothing to do with Russia as a potential military power? 
(Cited in Solomon, 1998, 81) 
 
Western opponents of NATO enlargement further argued that despite Russia’s 
rhetoric against NATO expansion, Russia could not feasibly constitute a threat to Eastern 
Europe, militarily or economically (Barany, 2003). With a large portion of the NATO 
expansion debate focusing on whether Russia constituted a threat to Europe, Russia could 
not help but view NATO expansion as inherently anti-Russian. The Russian security 
apparatus viewed the initial expansion with hostility and a sense of betrayal.  On this, 




“To Russia’s military establishment, the notion that NATO is anything other than 
a classically military alliance is risible.  The notion that NATO is not what it used 
to be – an anti-Russian alliance – is, in Russian eyes, made equally risible by 
NATO enlargement.” (2009, 295)  
Rhetoric from the Russian security services soon became hostile, with several 
ranking officials making comments equating NATO’s expansion to a direct military 
threat against Russian national security.  Russia’s Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev said: 
 
The approaching of NATO’s infrastructure to Russian borders is a direct increase 
of NATO’s combat possibilities, which is unfavorable for our country in a 
strategic sense.  We will regard the approaching of NATO’s tactical aviation to 
Russian borders as an attempted nuclear threat. (Cited in Blank, 2000, 15) 
Russia’s Chief of the General Staff added, “we will view NATO’s further 
practical actions for eastward enlargement and for annexing Central and East European 
states to it as a challenge to national security” (Cited in Blank, 2000, 15).   
Throughout the 1990s Russia did make attempts to cooperate with NATO and the 
West, including participating in the Partnership for Peace initiative beginning in 1994. 
With few concrete protest measures available to Russia, Partnership for Peace 
participation was ceased in protest of both NATO bombing in Bosnia as well as NATO’s 
campaign in Kosovo. 
Russia’s perceptions of NATO’s purpose remained mostly unchanged throughout 
the 1990’s, with suspicion and hostility forming the bedrock of Russian attitudes. 
Because of the disarray of Russia’s military through the 1990’s, Russia did not maintain 
an updated and active military doctrine until 2000, though “since the mid-1990s, the 
premise of Russian military planning and policy has been that any activity undertaken by 
NATO near Russian territory is a threat to Russia” (Sherr, 2009, 295). It was following 
NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo that Russia decided to modernize both its military 




NATO. Russia’s published Military Doctrine 2000, while not explicitly listing NATO as 
one of Russia’s primary security threats, contains very direct references, such as the 
threat of “expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian 
Federation's military security,” among others. That Russia’s official military doctrine 
referenced the perceived NATO threat demonstrates that opposition to NATO and NATO 
expansion was deeply entrenched in Russia’s political leadership. 
“Moreover, in the wake of the events of 9/11, Putin assumed that the West, which 
now needed Russia in the ‘war on terror,’ would acquiesce in its preferred format for 
global cooperation” (Sherr, 2009, 293).  NATO’s second expansion, combined with 
Western support for the various “colored” revolutions across the former Soviet sphere 
dispelled Putin’s hopes that the West would alter its ways in favor of Russia.  The second 
round of NATO expansion, between 2002 and 2004, would prove especially troublesome 
for Russia, as it included bids by the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  Were 
the Baltics allowed into NATO, Russia would lose a strategically important stretch of 
buffer area against NATO, and NATO would now directly border Russia.  The NATO 
inclusion of the Baltics not only reduced Russia’s physical buffer, but their ideological 
sphere of influence, and put several other important regions at risk.  Between 2002 and 
2004, Georgia announced intentions to join NATO and underwent its Rose Revolution, 
Ukraine was beginning its Orange Revolution and had been orienting towards NATO, 
and Finland (a long-time Partnership for Peace member) began militarily supporting 










THE 2007 MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE 
By late 2006, Russia was becoming uneasy with its standing in the world, and 
with the way NATO and the West in general treated Russia. In June, 2006, Putin 




noted the need for Russia to engage and partner with the other major powers in the world, 
but that such partnerships, particularly with the United States, “could only be built within 
a framework of equal status and mutual respect.” Russia continued to give hints that 
NATO and the West could not continue, without recourse, along the path of Russian 
relations that they were on. The situation was not yet so dire as to be beyond diplomacy, 
and President Putin took Russia’s diplomatic grievances to their source. 
It was the first time a Russian leader above foreign minister had been invited to 
speak at the Munich Security Conference. With a participating audience well beyond 
NATO, and a focus on political and security issues throughout the European and Eurasian 
spheres, the Munich Security Conference was arguably the largest and most prestigious 
venue for a national leader outside the U.N. Ronald Asmus refers to the Munich 
conference as “the citadel of NATO conferences” (105). For this first-ever address, many 
in the West were expecting Putin to give a speech focused on “friendship and 
partnership” (Asmus, 2010, 105). This attitude was telling of the West’s growing 
arrogance towards Russia, expecting Russia’s president to come to the conference with 
an attitude of conciliation and abrogation to the self-proclaimed bastion of freedom and 
democracy (Tsygankov, 2009). Instead, Putin addressed the conference as a 
contemporary, asserting Russia’s independence from the West and dismissing the 
unipolar worldview fostered by the West.   
The West received this speech with confusion, resentment and hostility.  Asmus, 
who was in attendance, described the audience as “stunned,” with the Americans “in 
shock” at hearing “a stem-winder of an anti-Western speech that contained a laundry-list 
of Russian complaints against the United States” (105). Asmus wondered if Putin 
realized “how insulting [this speech] was to the conference hosts” (105). NATO’s 




helpful” (Quoted in Watson, 2007). Gordon Johndroe, the U.S. National Security Council 
spokesman described the White House’s reaction as “surprised and disappointed” 
(Quoted in Tully, 2007; Shanker & Landler, 2007).  The next day U.S. Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates joked about Putin’s speech evoking “nostalgia” for the Cold War (Tully, 
2010). U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman joined Secretary Gates in referring to the Cold 
War, describing the speech as “confrontational”, with “rhetoric” that “takes us back to the 
Cold War” (Shanker & Landler, 2007). In all honesty, Putin’s speech should not have 
been unexpected. Indeed, given German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s opening speech at 
the conference, no one in attendance should have been surprised when Putin took her 
invitation to “engage in a frank exchange of views” (Merkel, 2007). It seems more that 
the West was looking neither for frankness nor exchange of differing views, but instead 
for ideological placation and a form of Russian endorsement for Western policy.   
Regardless of how the West received Putin’s speech, it was neither hostile nor 
insulting, and if the U.S. took specific offense due to Asmus’ “laundry list of 
complaints,” then perhaps it was because Putin’s comments hit too close to home. Some 
of the Western response to the speech was likely political showmanship meant to convey 
solidarity with the greater Western and NATO responses. Because of the alarmist 
response given by the West, Putin’s speech deserves a specific look to determine if it 
was, in fact, the figurative bol’shoi fig5 that the West took it as. Russia analyst Andrei 
Tsyganov described the likely motivations for Putin’s speech as: 
 
Meant to convey Russia’s frustration with its inability to develop more equitable 
relations with the United States. Rather than sending the message of a threat, the 
Kremlin was desperate to be heard that it was Russia, not America, that had to 
                                                 
5 Russian – большой фиг. A conversational diminutive of mild vulgarity.  To “give someone the fig” is 
roughly the equivalent of the English “thumbing one’s nose” at someone, but not as harsh or vulgar as 





swallow the war in the Balkans, two rounds of NATO expansion, the U.S. 
withdrawal from the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, military presence in 
Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq, and, now, plans to deploy elements of nuclear 
missile defense in Eastern Europe. (2009, p. 317) 
Putin’s speech encompassed all of the primary issues that Russia has taken with 
the West, NATO and their attitudes and behaviors since the end of the Cold War.  
Putin even began his speech by forewarning that his comments were going to 
“avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty 
diplomatic terms,” and asked his listeners, “if my comments seem unduly polemical, 
pointed or inexact… then I would ask you not to get angry with me.”  It seems that 
Putin’s task with this speech was neither deliberate offense nor hostility, but instead a 
chance to plainly delineate Russia’s positions and leave no room for Western 
misinterpretation. 
Putin began by framing the actions and mindset of the West against that of the 
Cold War, of “ideological stereotypes,” “double standards” and a “bloc mentality” – a 
thinly veiled dig at the continued existence of the Cold-War-born NATO. He decried the 
idea of the unipolar world as “pernicious” for all involved, including the sovereign pole, 
as it “destroys itself from within.” Pointing out one of Russia’s main views against the 
West – the hypocritical nature of export democracy, Putin stated, “We are constantly 
being taught about democracy, but for some reason those who teach us do not want to 
learn themselves.”  
 The forcing of Western democracy onto Russia, and the expectation that the 
Kremlin would conform to Western ideals and intentions was one of Russia’s biggest 
qualms. While the Soviet Union was hardly known for its democratic nature, it was still 
one of the world’s two superpowers. The tone of the Western approach to 




sincere desire to help. As was demonstrated by the way NATO classified Russia as 
simply one of several post-Soviet states, that tone became increasingly condescending as 
the West, the U.S. in particular, began to treat Russia not as an equal, but as a 
subordinate.  
In response to Western unipolarity, Putin suggested the need to “seriously think 
about the architecture of global security,” giving attention to the BRIC6 nations, and their 
increasing political, economic and security power in the world. The GDP of India and 
China, Putin suggested, outweigh that of the United States in purchasing power parity, 
and the combination of GDP of the BRIC states is greater than that of the EU. This gap in 
GDP “will only increase in the future” and “will strengthen multipolarity.”  With this 
strengthened multipolarity will be greater use of multilateral diplomacy. Pointing out the 
economic strengths of the rising world powers, Putin attempted to give the West the 
perspective that it was no longer the sole source of power, whether economic or political, 
in the world. 
Putin’s next point of contention is unilateral and extra-U.N. military actions, 
which, Putin noted, “have not resolved any problems.” This has been one of Russia’s 
most enduring complaints against the west, beginning with NATO action against Bosnia, 
and continuing through Kosovo, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
continuation of those conflicts. President Putin decried the West’s penchant for unilateral 
military action over political solutions as “an almost uncontained hyper-use of force” 
which was “plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.” He then lambasted 
the United States specifically as having a “greater and greater disdain for the basic 
principles of international law,” meaning the treaties and norms established within the 
                                                 




legal framework of the U.N. He argued that diplomacy should be the first effort and 
military force should only be used as an “exceptional measure,” and that “the only 
mechanism that can make decisions about using military forces as a last resort is the 
Charter of the United Nations.” He remarked that a Western diplomat had posited that 
military action should be considered legal when taken under the direction of “NATO, the 
EU, or the U.N.” Putin dismissed this idea, stating that “the use of force can only be 
considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the U.N.” adding, “we do not need 
to substitute NATO or the EU for the U.N.” The issue of whether Russia’s attitudes 
towards Western use of military force are justified is examined in the next chapter, 
though at this point it is sufficient to note that the same Western nations which scorned 
Russia for violating the territorial integrity of Georgia in 2008 had violated the territorial 
integrity of several sovereign nations by that time7. 
 Putin continued his speech by addressing another of Russia’s primary complaints 
against the West, and specifically NATO – plans for a ballistic missile defense system in 
Europe.  These plans, born out of a withdrawal by the United States from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, were ostensibly made in response to the threat of ballistic 
missile-delivered weapons of mass destruction from so called “rogue states” such as Iran 
or North Korea.  Stating that “plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defense 
system to Europe cannot help but disturb us,” Putin asked, “Who needs the next step of 
what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race?”  The idea that North Korea would 
try to launch a missile across Eurasia, directed at the United States, “obviously 
                                                 
7 These nations include Somalia (1993), Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).  As of Putin’s 
2007 speech, the Arab Spring had yet to develop and NATO action in Libya had not yet started.  While 
there are varying and often compelling justifications for military action against each of these nations, the 
fact of the matter remains that NATO and Western forces operating outside of U.N. authority conducted 
offensive military operations against these nations.  Western military operations in Iraq concluded in 2011, 




contradicts the laws of ballistics.”  Since no other “problem countries” have missiles 
capable of reaching those under the protection of the system, this logic amounts to “using 
the right hand to reach the left ear.” 
Beyond missile defenses, Putin sharply criticized the continued expansion of 
NATO.  Due to the shifting attitudes toward eligibility of candidate nations, as well as the 
geographical nature of the alliance, Putin declared, “I think it is obvious that NATO 
expansion does not have any relation to modernization of the Alliance itself or with 
ensuring security in Europe.” Importantly, at this time Russia and NATO were locked in 
heated debate over the eligibility and right of Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO.  While 
NATO expansion to the Baltics was painful to the former Soviet Union, Russia felt it had 
both a historical and cultural claim to Ukraine, and to Georgia, in addition to the debate 
over whether “Europe” extended to the Caucasus. Not only was NATO expanding to 
Russia’s borders, but the post-Warsaw Pact Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces of 
1999 had still not been ratified by NATO as a bloc. Putin acknowledged that some 
nations would not ratify “until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and 
Moldova,” but assured that Russia was leaving those locations “according to an 
accelerated schedule.”  
“We very often hear… appeals by our partners… that Russia should play an 
increasingly active role in world affairs,” commented Putin, responding:  
 
In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is 
hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans 
more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry 
out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition 
today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we 
have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we 
would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we 
could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would 




In an editorial address published in the L.A. Times, Russian Ambassador to the 
U.S., Yuri Ushakov echoed President Putin, writing:  
 
What offends us is the view shared by some in Washington that Russia can be 
used when it is needed and discarded or even abused when it is not relevant to 
American objectives. Russians do not need any special favors or assistance from 
the United States, but we do require respect in order to build a two-way 
relationship. And we expect that our political interests will be recognized. 
(Ushakov, 2007) 
 President Putin’s speeches in 2007, and the clarification from Ambassador 
Ushakov a few months later were Moscow’s final attempt at diplomatically warning the 
West that Russia desired to be treated as an equal, as a major power state politically, 
economically and militarily. Moscow had spent nearly 15 years under the premise that 
the West remained a status quo entity, and that an overall strategy of cooperation with the 
West would yield reciprocal cooperation and not defection. However, those 15 years had 
shown Moscow that cooperation with the West only yielded mutual cooperation when 
Russia’s position conformed to Western desires. Otherwise, Russian cooperation with the 
West was often met with defection.  Looking at NATO expansion specifically: 
 
If NATO were to expand unconditionally, admitting anyone who applied, it 
would be difficult to portray this to Russians as an effort by a benign security 
community to foster cooperation, because membership would not be conditional 
on cooperation.  Instead, it would look like an expansionist West attempting to 
encircle Russia. (Kydd, 2001, 803) 
Adding to Moscow’s perceptions, NATO expansion was quickly reducing 
Russia’s strategic buffer against the West, especially following expansion to the Baltic 
states. The reduction of geographical buffers then led to the reduction of important 
spheres of influence, which Russia had held historically, either under Tsarist Russia, the 
Soviet Union or both. Whether the West deliberately defected in relations with Russia, or 




West was much more apt to grant defection than cooperation. Russia’s appeals for 
equality were in essence calls for the West to recognize that a mutually cooperative world 





Chapter 3: Kosovo, Unilateral Military Action and the Beginning of the 
Downfall of Relations. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia retained its permanent 
status on the U.N. Security Council, as well as its veto against what it saw as unnecessary 
or impractical military action. Aside from internal matters, which were not the purview of 
the U.N., Moscow believed that the U.N. would be the final grantor of permission for 
state-on-state military action. During the Cold War, the world existed as Jervis’ second 
world, where defense had the advantage and there was little differentiation between 
offensive and defensive postures. Soviet and NATO military doctrine taught the 
preeminence of the offense, but the threat of total nuclear war necessitated defensive 
politics.  Second strike capabilities brought nuclear defense to the forefront, and 
conventional weapons were optimized for use in both offense and defense. While the 
security dilemma existed, Soviet-Western relations were generally normalized and 
diplomacy was used to full effect to maintain the status-quo ante. Were post-Soviet 
security relations to remain focused between Russia and the Cold-War West, a status quo 
might have been maintained; however, a handful of newly independent post-Soviet states 
found themselves thrown into serious internal conflict, and would begin testing both the 
new Russia and the new West. 
BOSNIA: THE FIRST POST-SOVIET TEST OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
As post-Soviet ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia shifted into armed conflict, the U.N. 
recognized the potential for large-scale destruction. Following a tentative cease-fire 
between the various combatants, in 1992 the U.N. instituted the U.N. Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) as a peacekeeping effort in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As 




Serbs with the assistance of the Yugoslav Army began a campaign of oppression to 
capture Bosnian land and expel non-Serb peoples. Despite the establishment of 
UNPROFOR protected safe areas, non-Serbs continued to be ethnically cleansed, and 
several U.N. safe areas fell to Bosnian-Serb forces, with UNPROFOR soldiers being 
taken hostage (Phillips, 2005). By 1993 UNPROFOR had been rendered ineffective as a 
peacekeeping entity and as a fighting force8. 
NATO involvement in the conflict began as an early assistance program to the 
U.N., utilizing NATO naval airpower to monitor and enforce a U.N. embargo on 
weapons. NATO’s participation was welcomed by the U.N. Security Council as 
resolutions began to escalate resulting in U.N. air activity evolving from simply 
monitoring airspace to enforcing resolutions (Beale, 1999; Phillips, 2005). Slowly, 
though, a shift in authority happened as the U.N. authorized NATO to conduct Operation 
Deny Flight, which authorized NATO warplanes to enforce no-fly zones and flight 
restrictions over Yugoslavia, as well as provide close air support to UNPROFOR forces. 
Initially, requests for close air support had to be approved by the U.N. Secretary General 
himself, though after this process proved too cumbersome, the Secretary General 
delegated authority to his in-country representative. Under the framework of Operation 
Deny Flight, NATO began independent planning to conduct punitive and coercive 
airstrikes against Yugoslav forces, without close air support requests from UNPROFOR. 
In late 1994, NATO began conducting U.N. sanctioned airstrikes apart from close air 
support requests, but quickly stopped due to threats from Serb air defenses (Beale, 1999; 
Phillips, 2005)    
                                                 
8 Given UNPROFOR’s inability to affect peace, NATO estimated that a force of 150,000 to 400,000 would 
be required to effectively conduct UNPROFOR’s operations.  This estimate was not well received by the 




NATO’s aerial role over Bosnia changed dramatically when, in late 1995, the 
U.N. Secretary General granted UNPROFOR commanders the authority to approve 
NATO close air support requests without consulting U.N. civilian representatives (Beale, 
1999). Additionally, the U.N. and NATO agreed to an increased role for NATO airpower.  
Under this agreement NATO planned Operation Deliberate Force, a massive air 
campaign designed to support UNPROFOR and the U.N. Rapid Reaction Force. While 
Operation Deliberate Force was conducted in conjunction with U.N. elements, it was an 
entirely NATO operation, unsupported by a U.N. resolution. For NATO, this was the 
proverbial foot in the door toward the position that NATO could conduct military action 
outside of the U.N. charter. 
Operation Deliberate Force was successful in bringing the Balkan belligerents to 
negotiations, resulting in the Dayton Accords and the implementation of a NATO-led 
peacekeeping force, named the Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995, which absorbed 
the EU elements of UNPROFOR. With the Dayton Accords, NATO assumed full 
responsibility for the Balkan conflict and for peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1031, which gave post-facto U.N. 
authorization for the operation of IFOR, and effectively divested the U.N. of any 
authority regarding military operations in the area (UNSCR 1031). In 1996 IFOR 
activities were transferred to NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), which remained until 
2004. 
Russia was an active participant in the U.N. effort to stop the fighting, with 
Russian airborne battalions conducting peacekeeping duties in Croatia and Sarajevo. 
Moscow supported each the U.N. resolutions and its paratroopers were some of the only 
non-EU forces in UNPROFOR. Kremlin opposition to NATO involvement in the U.N. 




airstrikes following the shelling of a Bosnian marketplace. Russia convened an 
emergency meeting of the Security Council, and Russian government officials expressed 
their opposition to the ultimatum and to NATO’s growing role in the conflict. The crux of 
Russian opposition, though, lay not in the need for airstrikes against the Bosnian Serb and 
Yugoslav forces, but in the fact that the ultimatum came from NATO, and not the U.N.  
President Boris Yeltsin expressed on several occasions that Russia believed that only the 
U.N. could direct military action (McDonald, 1994; Kipp & Warren, 2003). 
Another point of Russian consternation with NATO action was what Russians 
saw as a distinct bias against the Bosnian Serbs. Russian diplomats and military 
personnel lamented the quickness with which the U.N. sanctioned NATO airstrikes 
against Bosnian-Serb targets, but were slow to sanction airstrikes against Bosnian 
Muslims (Kipp & Warren, 2003). Within Russia, public opinion was vastly in support of 
the Serbs, and support for Yeltsin was low. In 1995, a rocket propelled grenade was even 
fired at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, fortunately with no injuries or loss of life (Kipp & 
Warren, 2003). Regardless of public opinion in Russia, the Russian airborne forces were 
integrated into the NATO peacekeeping plan very successfully under a unique chain of 
command which placed strategic control of the Russian force in the hands of the Russian 
General Staff, operational control in the hands of NATO’s Deputy Commander for 
Russian Forces Colonel-General Leontiy Shevtsov, and tactical control in the hands of 
U.S. Army Major General William Nash (Kipp & Warren, 2003). Both NATO and 
Russia agreed to this structure, as well as to a suitable location for Russian responsibility. 
Russian and NATO forces worked very well together under this arrangement, even 




KOSOVO AND NATO’S SHIFT  
“Kosovo became a moment of truth for Russia that rendered efforts to work with 
NATO towards equal security ‘totally worthless’” (Blank, 2000, 16). 
 
While NATO’s gradual consolidation of military authority in Bosnia caused 
concern for Russian politicians, the efforts made by NATO to include Russian military 
forces and leadership went far to create goodwill between Russia and the West, despite 
ongoing political tensions over the NATO enlargement debate and Western criticism for 
the poorly executed war in Chechnya. Russia had finally agreed to membership in the 
Partnership for Peace program in 1994 after initially rejecting membership in protest of 
NATO airstrikes in Bosnia.   
NATO Assumes the Role of Europe’s Police Force 
In 1997 and 1998, upon seeing successful progress towards true independence in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, separatists in the Southern Serbian province of Kosovo began to 
conduct attacks against the Serbian government. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
emerged as the primary anti-Serb force, determined to affect independence for the 
province and its Albanian majority. In response, Serbia began an ethnic cleansing 
campaign against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. As hostilities increased, international 
tensions began to grow as well. Russia made attempts to work with the Serb leadership to 
enact a cease-fire and establish an international observer mission. The United States and 
NATO were threatening Serbia with military action and establishing direct ties with the 
KLA, despite its classification as a terrorist group. Russian President Boris Yeltsin made 
a joint statement with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to the U.N. in which they 
emphasized the need to resolve the conflict politically and emphasized the importance of 
territorial integrity and national sovereignty (UNSC PR 6577). The U.N. Security 




sides to work towards peace. Neither of the resolutions authorized the use of force, 
however, and Secretary General Kofi Annan stated his belief that there was no military 
solution to the problem in Kosovo (UNSC PR 6577). 
It is surprising, then, that the North Atlantic Council would vote to issue an 
Activation Order (ACTORD) and put NATO forces on high alert for action in Kosovo. 
Without U.N. authorization for action, NATO had no legal justification for preparing for 
operations in Kosovo. Since the Bosnia campaigns, though, NATO had assumed a much 
greater role in European security and as the U.N. had granted NATO full authority in 
Bosnia, NATO began operating under the assumption that the same authority applied 
across Europe. NATO assumptions of authority for military action received a boost in 
1998 when the United States undertook a four-day campaign of airstrikes against Iraq 
without U.N. authorization. While the United States argued that the strikes were carried 
out in support of existing U.N. resolutions against Iraq, and as punishment for Iraqi non-
compliance with U.N. resolutions, there was nevertheless no sanction for the strikes. 
Russia responded with strong criticism, with Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev 
stating that the strikes “flagrantly violated the norms of international law and openly 
ignored the world community’s efforts to settle the situation” (Quoted in Renfrew, 1998). 
These were the same concerns which had initially been raised against NATO 
involvement in Bosnia, and the same which would be reiterated over Kosovo. 
There was, however, no serious recrimination against the United States or Great 
Britain for their strikes against Iraq. After NATO’s ACTORD issuance, a cease-fire was 
quickly agreed to, and the Kosovo Verification Mission was initiated under the auspices 
of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At this time, though, 
there was still no legitimate opposition to NATO’s intentions to conduct both air and 




fire and hostilities resumed, NATO arbitrarily assumed the lead for handling the situation 
in Kosovo and announced that the NATO “Secretary General may authorize air strikes 
against targets on the FRY territory” (NATO PR 1999). NATO also assumed the lead in 
negotiations, directing the Rambouillet Talks between delegations from Serbia, Russia, 
the United States, Albania and Great Britain. The results of these negotiations, known as 
the Rambouillet Accords, were ratified by the three Western parties, but rejected by both 
Russia and Serbia due to a requirement for NATO administration of Kosovo and NATO 
freedom of movement throughout all of Serbia. Throughout the process, though, the U.N. 
remained uninvolved in negotiations. On March 24, 1999, NATO initiated the bombing 
campaign against Serb forces titled Operation Allied Force.   
Russia, together with China, introduced a draft Security Council resolution to 
condemn the unilateral use of force in Kosovo, however, the resolution was vetoed by the 
United States and Great Britain (UNSC PR 6659). The Russian reaction to NATO’s 
unilateral intervention in Kosovo was both politically and rhetorically hostile, with 
Russian government support for Serbia and large numbers of Russian civilians 
volunteering to fight for Serbia. Ronald Asmus describes Russia’s position as believing 
that “the United States was once again acting as if it had the right to impose its will on 
the world,” that Russia’s U.N. veto power was “inconsequential,” and that this was a 
“new doctrine of humanitarian interventionism with NATO as the world’s policeman” 
(91). 
NATO’s shift from a defensive status-quo alliance to an increasingly offensive 
and expansionary alliance created additional concerns for Russia, who was facing her 
own internal separatist conflicts. Russia began to worry that the NATO action in Kosovo 
could have been a precursor toward NATO support towards “secessionist or anti-Russian 




as throughout the CIS and former Soviet Bloc. Russian news media used a quote from 
U.S. General Wesley Clark, then Commander of NATO forces, in which he stated that 
“Russia is Serbia, and Chechnya is Kosovo” (Quoted in Polit.ru, 1999). Attitudes such as 
this only served to heighten Russia’s anti-NATO sentiments, even among moderates in 
the Russian government (Blank, 2000; Hassig, 2009). NATO action in Kosovo was also 
extremely unpopular with the Russian public, which staged massive demonstrations 
throughout Russia. Steven Blank argued in Threats to Russian Security that leading 
Russian security figures firmly believed that “until and unless NATO recants over 
Kosovo and gives Russia a veto over its operations, the threat of more Kosovo-like crises 
and operations will remain, freezing Europe (and Russia) into permanent insecurity” (14).  
NATO’s actions in Kosovo created enough consternation in the Kremlin, that 
some were willing to risk war for a political statement. When NATO’s assembled 
intervention force, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), announced the date they would enter 
Kosovo as June 12, 1999, the Russian military executed a high-speed movement of over 
200 paratroopers from bases in Bosnia to capture the airfield in Pristina – NATO’s 
planned headquarters for Kosovo ground operations – on June 11. Despite orders from 
General Clarke to recapture the airfield, the initial British and French KFOR elements 
simply moved to the airport and contained the Russian paratroopers, even providing food 
and water when Russian supplies ran out (Ivashov, 2005; Peck, 2010; Straughan, 2010). 
Russia quickly attempted to solidify its position in Pristina, by planning to send a 
battalion of paratroopers by air to reinforce from Russia, though this effort failed after 
Russia was refused overflight rights (Straughan, 2010; Peck, 2010). The Russian 





The Kosovo Precedent 
The NATO air strikes and subsequent peacekeeping actions in Kosovo ultimately 
established a precedent for offensive military action, by an aggressor state, beyond 
established borders, under the banner of “peacekeeping”. Even before NATO began 
bombing the Serbian Army, Russia recognized the potential for NATO’s “out of area” 
offensive operations to spread. These attitudes appeared in a 1998 article from the 
Russian General Staff, which accused NATO of acting beyond its zone of responsibility” 
and creating “double standards” for security (Quoted in Blank, 2000, 7). The article 
argues: 
 
When analyzing the development of events in the Balkans, parallels with the 
development of events in the Caucasus involuntarily suggest themselves: Bosnia-
Herzegovina is Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is Chechnya. As soon as the West 
and, in particular, NATO, has rehearsed the “divide and rule” principle in the 
Balkans under cover of peacekeeping, they should be expected to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries and 
Russia. It is possible to extrapolate the implementation of “peacekeeping 
operations” in the region involving military force without a U.N. Security Council 
mandate, which could result in the Caucasus being wrested from Russia and the 
lasting consolidation of NATO’s military presence in this region, which is far 
removed from the alliance’s zone of responsibility. (Quoted in Blank, 2000, 8-9) 
The article then asks the question, “is Russia prepared for the development of this 
scenario?” and subsequently answers: 
 
It is obvious that, in order to ensure that the Caucasus does not become an arena 
for NATO Allied Armed Forces’ military intervention, the Russian Government 
must implement a well defined tough policy in the Balkans, guided by the U.N. 
charter and at the same time defending its national interests in the region by 
identifying and providing the appropriate support for this policy’s allies. (Quoted 
in Blank, 2000, 9)  
By acting offensively in Kosovo, NATO solidified the security dilemma felt by 
Russia, creating the perception that NATO’s “out of area” actions were directed at Russia 




had acted without a U.N. mandate, it set the precedent that major powers, or major-power 
alliances, could conduct offensive military action without U.N. approval, and therefore 
without Security Council concurrence. By working around the Security Council, NATO 
effectively invalidated the veto authority and global standing of the permanent members, 
elevating itself and the NAC to a slightly-more-than-equal footing with the Security 
Council.  The U.S. bombings of targets in Iraq in 1998 only supported the replacement of 
the U.N. Security Council as the authoritative body for external military action.   
Affirming this belief, Russia’s Military Doctrine of 2000 outlined “attempts to 
weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security 
(primarily the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe [OSCE]),” “the utilization of military‐force actions as a means of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the 
generally accepted principles and norms of international law” as having a “destabilizing 
impact on the military-political situation” of the world. Plainly these references in 
Russia’s official military doctrine referenced NATO and Western activities through the 
1990’s. Even in Russia’s newest update to their official doctrine, Military Doctrine 2010, 
extra-U.N. military action is deliberately specified, stating that, “the desire to endow the 
force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions 
carried out in violation of the norms of international law” constitutes one of Russia’s 
primary military threats. 
NATO’s actions in Kosovo also solidified the preeminence of popular separatist 
movements over sovereign governments. Russia’s concern over the possibility of NATO 
intervention over Chechnya or any of the number of CIS separatist movements was 
driven by NATO’s quickness to support Kosovo’s bid for independence. Russia’s 





The parallels with Chechnya help us to understand why Russia is so shaken over 
Kosovo.  If Kosovo can achieve independence, then why not Chechnya?  
Irrespective of assurances that Kosovo’s case is unique and does not set a 
precedent, Moscow will continue see what it wants to see.  (RIN.ru, 29 March, 
2007) 
NATO argued that its support to Kosovo was in response to Serbian criminal 
activity against the ethnic Albanian majority, but Russia ardently maintained that the only 
evidence that Serbia had committed criminal acts came after NATO began bombing, thus 
negating in Russia’s mindset NATO’s moral justification for supporting Kosovo’s 
independence. Comparisons to the U.N. mandated peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and 
Croatia were also invalid in Russia’s eyes, as Kosovo had never had status as an 
independent republic, where Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia had held such status 
(RIN.ru, 2007). As Russia saw it, separatism and independence would be given favor 
over territorial integrity and established spheres of influence 
The final precedent set by NATO’s actions in Kosovo were in regards to the 
usefulness of large-scale air operations designed to pound an aggressor into submission, 
prior to insertion of ground forces. The precedent for airstrikes as a first resort for 
offensive or punitive military action was also reinforced by the American airstrikes 
against Iraq in 1998. Russia observed both the successes and failures of NATO’s air 
campaign and then attempted to replicate them later that year in their second Chechen 
campaign. A New York Times article from 1999 outlined the similarities between 
NATO’s Kosovo campaign and the initial stages of Russia’s second Chechen campaign, 
including quotes from Russian Air Force Commander Colonel-General Anatoly 
Kornukov, Russian analyst Pavel Felgenhauer and Russian newspaper Vremya to 
demonstrate that Russia was indeed taking its first page from NATO’s playbooks 




What began as a trend towards extra-U.N. military action and intervention on the 
part of the West soon became the way of life. After the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al 
Qaida against the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the West embarked on a 
string of wars and military actions. While this paper attempts to avoid comment on the 
moral justifications used for these actions, it does, however, look at the legality of global, 
unilateral or coalition military actions. While Western aims have never been occupation 
or annexation, they have openly been for regime change or as punishment for political-
military developments. The quickness with which the West turns to military solutions 
was one of President Putin’s primary complaints in his 2007 Munich speech, in which he 
said, “today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hypertrophied use of force – 
military force – in international relations… and as a result we do not have sufficient 
strength to find comprehensive solutions,” and that nations were “airily participating in 
military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate,” and finally asking, “why 
should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity?” 
Beyond setting precedents for international military intervention, the Kosovo 
operations also marked the definitive transition of world conditions relative to the 
security dilemma. NATO ceased to be a purely defensive alliance, and defensive postures 
no longer held the advantage over offensive postures. The post-Cold War world was 
evolving to be one of preemptive offensive strikes, expeditionary punitive warfare, 
regime change and support to separatists and revolutionary movements.  Russia, desiring 
to remain a status-quo power in a status-quo world where NATO remained an alliance 
focused on collective defense, would have to adapt to living in Jervis’ “doubly 
dangerous” first world, where offense held the advantage, but offensive and defensive 





Chapter 4: Western Missile Defense Initiatives and the Negation of 
Russia’s Nuclear Deterrent 
The third significant contributor to Russia’s security dilemma with the West is 
that of missile defense efforts. Since the Soviet Union’s successful detonation of the 
MOLNIYA atomic bomb in 1949, the Soviet Union and the United States have relied on 
deterrence under the ideas of guaranteed second-strike capabilities and mutually assured 
destruction to avoid nuclear war. Under the deterrence policies defensive postures ruled 
the day – ensuring survivability of weapons arsenals and delivery capabilities to ensure 
retaliatory strike capabilities should the other side initiate a surprise nuclear strike (Jervis, 
1978). As technology began to allow for the prospects of defending to negate a first 
strike, as opposed to simply surviving it, concerns were raised about the destabilizing 
effect of such a system. Deterrence and mutually assured destruction provided the 
stability of the system, stopping possible first strikes out of fear of the resulting second 
strike and inevitable destruction. If a missile defense shield could significantly reduce the 
risk of, or level of expected retaliatory destruction, it would remove the inhibitions 
against a first strike. If either of the two players suspected the other of having an 
operation missile defense shield, they may even strike preemptively to ensure that their 
opponent didn’t have the opportunity to do the same (Jervis, 1978; Woolfe, 2002). This is 
why the Space Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) was so effective, despite its 
budgetary and operational infeasibility. To the Soviet Union, SDI completely negated 
both their first and second strike capability, and greatly enhanced the United States’ 
capabilities (Krickus, 2009). Because of the destabilizing effects of these kinds of 
systems, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABMT) in 1972, which initially limited the two powers to only two possible missile 




Despite the ABMT, the United States continued to develop missile defense 
possibilities, and these efforts created significant consternation in Russian political and 
security circles. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ABMT’s applicability was 
debated in the United States, and left standing under President Bill Clinton as a 
Memorandum of Agreement among the various states of the former Soviet Union (U.S. 
DoS, 1997; Woolfe, 2002). Even as early as 2000, however, the future effects of 
continued Western ABMDS initiatives in Europe and the Americas were evident in 
Russia’s security communications. In his analysis of Russia’s threat perception and 
security doctrine, Stephen Blank notes, 
 
If one [considers] the threat posed by our pending decision about theater and 
national missile defense (TMD and NMD) which Russia regards as a threat to the 
very basis of strategic stability worldwide, then the reason and context for 
subsequent Russian statements and policies become much clearer. (2000, 9) 
In early 2000 the United States remained a party to the ABMT under the 1997 
Memorandum of Agreement, and while Russia chafed at the idea that the United States 
might decide to develop both a theater and national missile defense system, as noted 
above, Russia’s Doctrine 2000 has little direct reference to the prospect of Western 
missile defense, referencing as a threat only “the violation by certain states of 
international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament.” 
It would seem that while Russia was concerned about the prospect of U.S. missile 
defense advancements, Russia was not so concerned as to specify missile defense efforts 
as a threat. 
NATO ABMDS INITIATIVES 
In addition to advancing missile defense technologies, the United States altered 




nuclear arsenal and first strike capability had been the justification, as in the case of SDI, 
the United States began to cite the existence of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missile delivery systems in the hands of so called “rogue states” as being the primary 
threat (Krickus, 2009). This was primarily derived from the United States’ experience 
using PATRIOT missile systems to destroy Iraqi SCUD missiles during the first Gulf 
War in 1991. Advances in PATRIOT capabilities, and designs specifically targeting short 
range and theater ballistic missiles (SRBM and TBM) gave way to advances in 
technology capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The United 
States cited the ballistic missile technology existing in several states suspected of having 
or developing nuclear weapons as the primary threat. Shortly after the 9-11 terrorist 
attacks in 2001, the United States decided to withdraw from the ABMT, stating:  
 
Today, the United States and Russia face new threats to their security.  Principal 
among these threats are weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means 
wielded by terrorists and rogue states.  A number of such states are acquiring 
increasingly longer-range ballistic missiles as instruments of blackmail and 
coercion against the United States and its friends and allies.  The United States 
must defend its homeland, its forces and its friends and allies against these threats. 
 We must develop and deploy the means to deter and protect against them, 
including through limited missile defense of our territory. (White House Press 
Office, 2001) 
Operating fully on the idea that the greatest missile threat posed were ‘rogue 
states”, the United States developed a comprehensive missile defense plan with missile 
defense sites located first along the Pacific, ostensibly to guard against the possibility of 
North Korean missiles, and began planning for a European based site to protect against a 
perceived Iranian threat. The European site was to have interceptors and control elements 
based in Poland and the Czech Republic (Hildreth & Ek, 2011). Moscow, still reeling 
from the accession of Poland and the Czech Republic into NATO, saw the basing of 




instead as an example of the hostile expansionism of NATO. It also saw the US 
withdrawal from the ABMT as yet another example of Western disdain for recognized 
international law, supported by statements regarding the treaty as “ancient history,” “no 
longer relevant to our strategic framework,” and “outdated” (Woolfe, 2002, 29). 
Additional Russian concern came from a draft document leaked from the Bush 
administration which framed the United States as the lone world superpower for the 21st 
century, and feared that the United States would use missile defenses “to achieve nuclear 
dominance” (Krickus, 2009, 52). 
Even while the United States was still only making rhetorical statements about the 
inefficacy of the treaty, Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev said in 2001:  
 
The [1972] ABM Treaty, is the cornerstone for strategic stability and the basis for 
the system of international agreements in the sphere of the monitoring and control 
of weapons. Now it has been threatened due to the fact that the USA has decided 
upon the deployment of a national ABM system, which is prohibited by the 
[ABM] Treaty... If such a system is deployed in the USA, it [the treaty] will 
become meaningless. (Quoted in Woolfe, 2002, note 5) 
The Kremlin considered the ABMT a necessary part of security and stability 
throughout the world, and worried that if the US abandoned the treaty in favor of a 
missile defense system, it could trigger a global offensive nuclear arms race (Woolfe, 
2002). Primarily, though, Moscow viewed the development of a Western missile defense 
system as a direct threat to Russia’s offensive nuclear arsenal. Both the United States and 
NATO have sought to assure Russia that their missile defense plans were not directed at 
Russia’s nuclear arsenal, but instead at those identified “rogue nations” and “non-state 
actors” who could potentially develop or possess ballistic missile-based delivery systems 
for weapons of mass destruction. These assurances have come in the form of official 
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statements, informal agreement attempts, and even official capabilities briefings detailing 
how the systems would perform (Woolfe, 2002; Caves & Bunn, 2007).   
Russia has never fully accepted these claims, and has offered evidence to 
contradict the possibility that any existing “rogue states” had either the technical or 
development capability, nor the financial capital needed to develop ballistic missiles 
capable of hitting targets on United States territory, or on territory throughout Europe 
(Woolfe, 2002; Krickus, 2009). Even the technical assurances that the system was simply 
incapable of intercepting Russian ICBMs did little to persuade Russia, who declared that 
the initial system would simply be the basis for future upgrades and expansions which 
would negate Russia’s offensive nuclear capability. The argument to base interceptors in 
Poland made little sense against NATO’s stated threats, and were the reasoning behind 
Vladimir Putin’s statement during the 2007 Munich Conference that:   
 
Plans to expand certain elements of the missile defense system to Europe cannot 
help but disturb us… Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight 
thousand kilometers that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the 
so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not 
happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, 
a North Korean rocket to American territory through Western Europe obviously 
contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the 
right hand to reach the left ear. (Putin, 2007) 
With no clear understanding of the threat that was presented by the West, and no 
acceptance of the level of threat supposed by the West, Russia had no other logical 
conclusion other than to see Western missile defense efforts as directed against Russia. 
To make matters worse, a U.S. Missile Defense Agency report in 2009 explicitly stated 
the need to expand existing defense plans worldwide, and create a system capable of 




indicative of an end goal of providing a system “capable of defending the United States 
against any… ballistic missile second-strike capability” (Saanio, 2010, 45). 
The Kremlin reaction to Western missile defense plans began as political 
statements and opposition, primarily asserting the same arguments as before – that any 
missile defense system in Europe was both destabilizing in regards to arms controls and 
designed to counter Russia’s nuclear arsenal (Putin, 2007). Moscow was additionally 
incensed that such a defense system would be based out of Poland and the Czech 
Republic, both former Soviet satellites and both within what Russia considered its sphere 
of influence. While Russia maintained a U.N. Security Council veto against the West, it 
had no recognized recourse against NATO or unilateral Western actions. Purely political 
and diplomatic statements had no real effect against Western actions, and soon Russian 
statements began taking on greater hostility and adding concrete responses.   
With a third round of NATO expansion threatening to include Ukraine and 
Georgia, Moscow perceived the threat that Western missile defense facilities would soon 
be based in those countries, further increasing Russia’s perceived insecurity. Between 
2007 and 2008, Russian rhetoric against the missile defense systems and the nations 
which had agreed, or might in the future agree to house facilities, became significantly 
more hostile. In 2007, Russian Missile Forces Chief General Nikolai Solovtsov warned 
that “if the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic [agree to base missile 
defenses in their territory]… the Strategic Missile Forces will be capable of targeting 
these facilities” (Quoted in Isachenkov, 2007). In August 2008, Russia’s Ambassador to 
NATO, Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia would create an “answer” to a European-
based system which “would be the most technically simplistic, completely effective and 
immediate” response possible (Dni.ru, 2008). Chief of the General Staff General Colonel 




Republic and any nation who might consider joining the missile defense coalition when 
he said that Poland had become a “priority target”, warning that: 
 
The United States is developing missile defenses to protect its own government, 
not Poland.  By hosting missile defense elements, Poland is placing itself in the 
line of fire, 100%.  It will become an active target.  These kinds of targets are, by 
priority, destroyed in first order. (NEWSru.com, 2008) 
The timing of this particular warning was made poignant by the fact that Russia 
had agreed to a cease-fire in Georgia only three days prior. Just a few months later in 
November, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated this threat by stating 
that “as a necessary step to neutralizing [Western] missile defenses, ‘Iskander’ tactical 
ballistic missile complexes would be moved into Kaliningrad,” (Bilevskaya, Samarina, & 
Petrovskaya) with a direct border with Poland. 
Leading up to 2008, Russia had been consistent in its messages about Western 
missile defense initiatives. The West’s continued development of a missile defense 
system and the abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the United States despite these 
messages and warnings showed Russia that the West was not willing to listen. With a 
combination of continued NATO expansion, both in geography, influence and authority, 
continued political wrangling over, and a general Western push for recognized 
independence for Kosovo, and continued advancement of Western missile defense 
initiatives, Russia’s security dilemma became markedly pronounced, and the conditions 





Chapter 5: The Culmination of Russia’s Western Security Dilemma 
In early 2008 Russia’s security dilemma was becoming so pronounced that Russia 
felt compelled to action. From a geographical perspective, Russia had effectively lost 
Europe to NATO, either through full membership or partnership with the alliance. The 
Far East was falling to Chinese strength, and with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
United States was quickly building influence in both the Middle East and Central Asia. 
Russia was fighting hard to remain the dominant influence in Central Asia, waging their 
diplomatic wars particularly against NATO’s Manas Air Base, a logistics hub on the 
outskirts of Bishkek, convincing the Kyrgyz government on a nearly annual basis to deny 
the Americans presence. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, the United States and NATO 
fought back financially, making the air base each year more lucrative than Russian 
political offers. Russia’s saving grace in Central Asia is that the United States cannot 
remain permanently. Eventually the war in Afghanistan will end, with current timelines 
anticipating that end to come in 2014 or 2015, and as American forces leave the area, so 
will the United States’ willingness to pay large sums of money to ensure loyalty among 
the Central Asian governments. All Moscow really needs to do to remain the dominant 
regional power in Central Asia is wait out the Americans and keep the Chinese focused to 
the South. The growing problem for Russia was the Caucasus region. The West had taken 
great interest in the region, in part due to the immense oil and gas resources found in the 
Caspian Sea, and also because of the area’s strategic nature, connecting Europe and 
NATO via a border with Turkey with Central Asia to the East and the increasingly 
threatening Iran to the South. Both Georgia and Ukraine had publicly expressed interest 
in joining NATO, with Georgia making every effort to gain membership. Western 




Ceyhan, Turkey, via Tbilisi, Georgia, to bypass Russia and create a competitive 
alternative to Russian energy dominance in the Black Sea region and Europe. North of 
the Greater Caucasus, Russian interior forces were still involved in a fragile 
counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya and Dagestan. In the Caucasus, Moscow could 
not just wait out the West. 
The situation in the Caucasus contained each of the major points of contention 
with the West which contributed to Russia’s security dilemma, namely:  
 If NATO were to expand to the Caucasus and Ukraine, Russia would be nearly 
surrounded by what it regarded as a hostile alliance. Moscow had argued 
adamantly against NATO accessing states which directly bordered Russia in the 
case of the Baltics, but the Baltics had only been a part of the Soviet Union by 
conquest.  Georgia and Ukraine were considered historically integral to Russia – 
extensions of Russia herself. Both Georgia and Ukraine had expressed interest in 
joining the alliance, and the Kremlin still harbored acute hostility against the 
“colored revolutions” which had occurred in the two nations, setting them each on 
a decidedly Western course. Accession into NATO by either of these two would 
be tantamount to treason in Moscow’s eyes, and their loss would be devastating to 
both the sitting Russian government, especially including President Vladimir 
Putin, and to the general international prestige and national pride of Russia as a 
nation. 
 If NATO moved into the Caucasus, NATO troops would inevitably follow, 
especially under the Partnership for Peace program; placing the hotly contested 
Chechnya within range of what some in Russian security circles saw as a potential 
NATO “humanitarian mission” designed to affect the independence of Chechnya. 




United States initiative in 2002 to bring the Georgian military closer to Western 
standards and improve counter-terror capabilities. GTEP called for U.S. Special 
Forces and Marines to train the Georgian military. In 2005 GTEP gave way to the 
Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), in which U.S. 
Special Forces and Marines continued to train Georgian forces, with a focus on 
preparing Georgian troops for deployment to Iraq (Roberts, 2005; Moor, 2005, 
Tseluiko, 2010). While GSSOP put U.S. troops in Georgia on an annual basis, 
their numbers were rarely more than 200; definitely not concerning numbers. In 
2008 Georgia agreed to host the United States’ annual Immediate Response 
exercise, which brought together U.S., NATO and other coalition troops to train 
jointly.  During Immediate Response 2008 Georgia hosted approximately 1600 
troops from the United States, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, and focused 
training on certifying the Georgian 4th Infantry Brigade for deployment to Iraq 
(Reuters, 2008; Noel, 2008; Kerdzevadze, 2008). Still, much like the small fighter 
element posted in the Baltics, Russia tilted at the windmills of NATO troops in 
the Caucasus. Moscow’s most direct security concern regarding NATO forces in 
the Caucasus was the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which was only accessible by air, as Georgia would not allow Russia a ground 
supply route (Felgenhauer, 2008a). An increased NATO presence, including air 
forces, could conceivably, no matter how unlikely, cut the Nagorno-Karabakh 
contingent off, creating a major crisis for Russia. Georgia dismissed Russia’s 
concerns.  In a March, 2007, interview with the British Broadcasting Company, 
Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that he “could not understand 
what it [was] that scared Russia so much about nations, for example the Baltics, 




tell us, ‘You know, NATO means military bases and the like,’ I answer, ‘NATO 
does not mean military bases!’ We’ve explained many times, ‘Well, the Baltics 
joined NATO, did military bases appear there? No.’” 
 Georgian NATO membership would also almost guarantee a new base for missile 
defense facilities, ostensibly directed against the threat from an Iranian “rogue 
state”. In May, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili indicated to 
the Financial Times that “If [the U.S.] came and told us that they want to [base 
missile defenses in Georgia], we would certainly be willing to talk about it.” 
(Schmid, Ehrlich & Sevastupolo, 2007). While the previous March Bezhuashvili 
had been cautious about declaring support for missile defense plans, now he 
openly invited it, though he clarified that there were no ongoing negotiations, nor 
had the United States approached Georgia about placing missile defense assets in 
the Caucasian state, but Bezhuashvili clearly demonstrated that Georgia was not 
only willing, but eager to accommodate. 
With all three of Russia’s security dilemma factors present in Georgia and the 
Caucasus region, it is not surprising that this is where Russia took action, especially given 
the history between the two nations.  This chapter examines the historical factors which 
made Georgia the most advantageous location for Russia to make a military statement 
against the West, the events of 2008 which brought Russia to the point of action, Russia’s 
prosecution of the war, and the immediate aftermath of the invasion. 
THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF RUSSO-GEORGIAN RELATIONS 
The first aspect that must be examined is the long-running and complicated 
relationship between Russia and Georgia. Since Georgia’s incorporation in to the Russian 




ultimately a full-fledged part of Russia. Georgia has chafed under such a categorization, 
making a few ultimately failed attempts at seceding from both the Russian Empire and 
the Soviet Union (Nohlan, et al, 2001; Goltz, 2009). The early Soviet Union even invaded 
Georgia to emplace a Bolshevik government, and continuing “an existing relationship of 
a protectorate state and its imperial master.” (Mackinlay & Sharov, 2003, p. 64). 
Following integration into the new Soviet state, Georgia underwent severe repression by 
the Cheka through the 1920’s and 1930’s (Jones, 1988). 
With communist control over Georgia fully situated, relations and life normalized 
and remained so for the next 60 years Georgia remained happy in a “Socialist Heaven” as 
Thomas Goltz describes (Goltz, 2009, p. 14). Despite the communist control over the 
populace, power concentrations within Georgia still tended to gravitate around the 
historically powerful and nationalist families which remained at odds with the 
communists (Mackinlay & Sharov, 2003). This current of nationalism which remained, 
behind the scenes, began to show itself again in the 1980s as policies of glasnost and 
perestroika enabled a greater freedom to discuss politics. In the late 1980s political 
conversation began to turn towards the idea of independence; not only in Georgia proper, 
but in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara as well (Mackinlay & Sharov, 2003). 
Discussions inevitably turned into demonstrations, culminating in a series of 
demonstrations in late March and early April, 1989. Soviet authorities sent internal troops 
stationed in Georgia to disperse the crowds on April 9, 1989, when overeager and overly 
brutal local commanders illegally committed Spetznaz airborne forces, resulting in the 
deaths of 21 Georgian protesters (Sobchak, 1989; Mackinlay & Sharov, 2003; Nohlen, et 
al, 2001). 
Following the April 9th tragedy, the 1990 Supreme Council elections in Georgia 




the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, handily won the Georgian parliament (Nohlen,et 
al, 2001). Even prior to the actual fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of the first of 
the republics to officially declare independence from the Soviet Union. On March 31, 
1991 Georgia held a referendum on independence in which 99.5% of voters approved 
secession from the Soviet Union (Nohlen, et al, 2001, p. 394). The official declaration of 
independence from the Soviet Union was delayed and announced in conjunction with the 
second anniversary of the April 9th tragedy. Shortly after, on April 14, Gamsakhurdia 
instituted the office of President of Georgia, and won the position with over 85% of the 
vote (Nohlen, et al, 2001, p. 372; Mackinlay & Sharov, 2003).   
Georgia’s bid for independence was again short-lived as Gamsakhurdia’s 
nationalists fell to a Kremlin-backed coup in December, 1991, which escalated into open 
conflict in January, 1992 between Zviadist nationalists and pro-Moscow factions within 
the Georgian National Guard, and in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (Nohlen, et al, 2001; Mackinlay & Sharov, 2003). With Gamsakhurdia forced out 
of leadership by the coup, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Georgian Communist Party 
leader and Soviet Foreign Minister, was placed in control of the now more pro-Kremlin 
Georgian state. Georgia remained in a state of civil war until 1994. In 1995 Shevardnadze 
was officially elected President of Georgia, with a new pro-Kremlin parliament also 
elected the same year. Shevardnadze’s ruling coalition, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia, 
was reelected as the parliamentary majority in 1999, with Shevardnadze reelected to the 
presidency in 2000 (Nohlen, et al, 2001). The pro-Kremlin nature of the Shevardnadze 
government began to wane, though, towards the end of the 1990’s, following accusations 
by the Kremlin of Georgian support to Chechen militants in the Pankisi Gorge and a 




This period between 1989 and 1995 was difficult for the collapsing Soviet Union 
and emerging Russia. Many in Moscow saw Georgia’s 1980s bid for independence as an 
offence toward the greater Russia. Georgians factored deeply into both Russian and 
Soviet history, with personalities such as Joseph Stalin, Laurenti Beria, and most recently 
the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. According to Ronald Asmus, “many 
Russians felt they were ‘losing’ not only a part of the former Russian Empire but a nation 
that had played a key role in shaping their own history” (Asmus, 2010, p. 56). Asmus 
argued as well that conservative and nationalist Russians “harbored a special hatred” for 
Shevardnadze, “blaming [him] for dismantling Moscow’s empire in Eastern Europe” as 
Foreign Minister (Asmus, 2010, p. 56; Gordadze, 2009). Moscow was keenly aware of its 
strategic interests in Georgia, and felt the need to maintain its influence (Mackinlay & 
Sharov, 2003). As Russia intervened militarily in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
conflicts with Georgia to maintain and enforce influence, trends within the Foreign 
Ministry and Defense Ministry emerged that saw Russian peacekeeping operations as a 
more effective means of ensuring that Russian interests in Georgia were maintained 
(Sagramoso, 2003). In Georgia, this led to the establishment of the Joint Peacekeeping 
Force (JPKF).   
The JPKF emerged from the initial Joint Control Commission (JCC); a result of 
the 1992 tripartite Sochi cease-fire agreements among the Russians, Georgians and South 
Ossetians. The JPKF was structured with a Russian peacekeeping battalion at the center, 
with a Georgian and a South Ossetian peacekeeping battalion accompanying. This force 
structure was agreed upon in Sochi and put into power by the JCC; the Organization for 
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) took on a role as observers. In 1993, Russia 
established a CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) to quell violence in Abkhazia, in similar 




is that the CISPKF consisted entirely of Russian forces acting as a buffer between 
Georgian and Abkhaz forces, and was given United Nations monitoring in the form of 
observers under the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) (Mackinlay & Sharov, 
2003). 
Relations with Russia continued to devolve following the nomination of Vladimir 
Putin as Prime Minister and the beginning of the Second Chechen War, as Shevardnadze 
refused Russian requests to control both the Russian and Georgian sides of the Chechen 
border. The Kremlin accused Georgia of aiding and assisting Chechen militants in the 
Pankisi Gorge, and responded by bombing villages in Pankisi in 2002 with the 
justification that Chechen militants and facilitators were operating from the Gorge 
(Gordadze, 2009). As relations worsened, Russian elements of the JPKF and CISPKF – 
which had historically supported and retained sympathies for the separatists – began to 
hinder Georgian efforts within the peacekeeping force. “What was supposed to be a 
neutral peacekeeping force became an imperialist and eventually an invading force” said 
Ronald Asmus of the Russian peacekeeping elements (Asmus, 2010, p. 65). To make 
matters worse, beginning in 2002 the Kremlin began citizenship drives in both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, offering Russian citizenship passports to any Abkhazians or South 
Ossetians who desired to be part of the Russian Federation (Allison, 2008; Illiaronov, 
2009; Asmus, 2010). As more and more Abkhazians and South Ossetians accepted 
Russian citizenship, Moscow could act as it wished, claiming the privilege of protecting 
Russian citizens (Allison, 2008; Popjanevski, 2009; Asmus, 2010). 
Russia’s relations with Shevardnadze deteriorated, with Russia signaling intent to 
use its UN counter-terror authority for military action against Georgia, and Shevardnadze 
responding by declaring his intention to join NATO (Illiaronov, 2009; Nichol, 2003). 




Revolution in 2003, Russia made efforts to keep him in power, as “whatever Moscow’s 
doubts about Shevardnadze, they paled in insignificance compared with its loathing of 
what have come to be known as the ‘color revolutions’” (Gordadze, 2009, p. 46). 
Moscow was unsuccessful and the Rose Revolution, led by Mihail Saakashvili, Zurab 
Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze overthrew Shevardnadze, with Saakashvili officially 
elected as President in 2004 (Illiaronov, 2009; Asmus, 2010). 
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
Western involvement in Georgia earnestly began shortly after the September 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States. The Kremlin had already been pressuring Georgia 
and threatening military action because of militant attacks in Chechnya, which Moscow 
claimed were being committed by groups based out of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. The 
Pankisi Gorge is a sparsely-populated mountain pass connecting the Georgian lowlands 
with Russia’s Dagestan and Chechnya. Aside from the Roki Tunnel in South Ossetia, 
Pankisi is one of only a few ground transportation routes across the Greater Caucasus, 
and the rugged passes facilitate unofficial and illicit travel. Russia argued that fighters 
from Chechnya had moved into Pankisi, gathering there along with Middle Eastern and 
other Central Asian militants, making Pankisi, in Moscow’s view, a center of 
international terrorism. Russia even claimed that Osama Bin Laden was hiding in Pankisi 
and that the Taliban had taken control of the villages there (Gordadze, 2009). The United 
States took interest in Pankisi after an Al Qaida associate contacted militants in Pankisi 
(Nichol, 2004, Gordadze, 2009). American intelligence services also tied Pankisi to Al 
Qaida, but on a much lower level (Powell, 2003).  
As Russian pressure on Georgia increased, Shevardnadze requested 




involving as many as 150 US special operations, marines and other military personnel. 
Tensions over Pankisi escalated in June, 2002 when a large group of Chechen militants 
attacked Russian forces just north of the Georgian border, leading Georgia to deploy 
GTEP-trained forces to the area to drive out the militants. Russia continued to look for 
justification to conduct military operations in Pankisi, even making sincere efforts to tie 
Pankisi into U.N. antiterrorism efforts led by the United States (Nichol, 2003; Gordadze, 
2009). Counterterrorism efforts under the GTEP program continued to keep Russian 
forces within Russian borders, and successful Georgian military operations in Pankisi 
allowed the tensions over Pankisi to ease greatly. Georgia, however, was quite pleased 
with the attention the United States was paying, as well as with the prospect of Western 
assistance in rebuilding Georgia’s military. When Georgia agreed to provide troops to the 
peacekeeping efforts in Iraq, the United States built the GTEP program into the GSSOP 
program, further solidifying Western influence on the Georgian military and economy 
(Tseluiko, 2010).  
While Georgia was making every effort to bring the West and NATO in, Russia 
was acting to create conditions in the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
which would give Western leaders pause about Georgia. Following the loss of the 
autonomous Adjara to the central Georgian government, Moscow began tightening 
control over the Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments (Allison, 2008; Illiaronov, 
2009). In early summer 2004 Russia began sending heavy military equipment and arms, 
unauthorized by the peacekeeping treaties, to South Ossetia, appointed a Russian general 
as the South Ossetian Defense Minister, established direct bus routes between Sochi and 
Abkhazia, and began stoking the South Ossetian militia to conduct attacks against 
Georgians (Illiaronov, 2009). The summer of 2004 nearly erupted into a second civil war 




small-arms, roadside bomb and mortar attacks.  Fortunately the situation quieted down 
after Georgia removed its non-peacekeeping forces late that August (Illiaronov, 2009). 
Russia also began building up military bases in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2004, 
expanding capacity and infrastructure (Illiaronov, 2008). 
Between 2004 and 2008 internal relations in Georgia normalized some, with a rise 
in attacks each August, but no significant hostilities. Moscow continued to interfere in 
politics in the separatist regions, primarily by installing Russian or Moscow-friendly 
politicians in both the separatist governments. In 2006, in response to a series of 
Georgian arrests of Russian intelligence agents, the Kremlin imposed economic and 
political sanctions against Georgia, began deporting Georgian workers from Russia, and 
increased the distribution of Russian passports to Abkhaz and Ossetian citizens (Allison, 
2008; Sherr, 2009). Following Vladimir Putin’s 2007 speech in Munich, Saakashvili 
announced Georgia’s intention to join NATO by 2009.  In April 2007 Georgia claimed 
Russia attacked the Georgian-controlled Abkhaz enclave in the Kodori Gorge with 
helicopters. A UNOMIG fact finding mission found that the attack could not have come 
from Abkhaz or Georgian forces, but stopped short of suggesting Russia as the attacker 
(Civil.ge, 2007). 
RELATIONS COME TO A HEAD: KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND THE NATO SUMMIT IN 
BUCHAREST, 2008 
 
As Georgian relations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia quickly soured 
through 2007, Georgia found itself between a political rock and a military hard place. 
Saakashvili’s administration was making efforts to convince a skeptical “old Europe” that 
Georgia was a viable candidate for admission into NATO, and making every attempt to 




same time Saakashvili continued trying to mend what little remained of relations with 
Moscow and appealed to the international community to avoid what he saw as the 
potential for conflict (Smith, 2009; Asmus, 2010). Despite these efforts, the Kremlin 
made little effort to reciprocate, and during bilateral talks, Vladimir Putin even gave 
Saakashvili advanced warning that conflict would come, when he said, “You know we 
have to answer the West on Kosovo.  And we are sorry but you are going to be part of 
that answer” (Cited in Asmus, 2010, 106). Later in the same meeting, Putin raised the 
second point on which Moscow’s decision to go to war with Georgia would rest: 
“NATO’s purpose is aimed against the sovereignty of Russia… After joining NATO your 
sovereignty will be limited, and Georgia, too, will be a threat to Russia” (Cited in Asmus, 
2010, 107). 
 Unfortunately for Georgia, the year 2008 began with two important and 
foreboding events. The first was that in spite of Russian opposition and negotiations, 
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This 
declaration came as a surprise to both Russia and Serbia, and was followed with the equal 
surprise of Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence (Asmus, 2010). Putin’s 
warning to Saakashvili became suddenly all too real. Georgia’s second major blow came 
when Russia’s influence among the major European NATO players proved too strong, 
and neither Georgia nor Ukraine were granted a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 
March 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest (Goble, 2009; Asmus, 2010). After months of 
diplomatic pressure on NATO to deny the two countries membership, Moscow 




pressure, influence both NATO as an organization, as well as individual countries within 
the alliance. When combined with international recognition of Kosovo along primarily 
NATO lines just two months before the Bucharest summit, Moscow was given a “double 
pretext to act against Georgia” (Asmus, 2010, 12). NATO’s rebuff to Georgia and 
Ukraine under pressure from Moscow was seen as one of several steps which contributed 
to the war, “the Kremlin understood,” wrote journalist Juliya Latynina, “that it’s hands 
had been loosed” (Latynina, 2008), following which the head of the Russian Military 
Staff said, “We will do everything to prevent Georgia from entering NATO” (Quoted in 
Illiaronov, 2008; Tsygankov, 2009). Moscow recognized the opportunity and took action, 
establishing direct legal and diplomatic relations with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
on 16 April, 2008 (Allison, 2008; Asmus, 2010; Illiaronov, 2008; Tsygankov, 2009). 
At this point Russia began taking concrete steps towards preparation for an 
invasion of Georgia, and setting up a framework allowing Moscow to conduct such an 
invasion with minimal diplomatic injury. Importantly, Georgia, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia each took a number of other steps directly contributing to conditions for war, 
but the preponderance of the effort rested on steps Russia took. Russian military and 
political preparation for the invasion began quietly, and was greatly aided by Putin’s 
withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe the previous year. Russia 
gathered an invasion force in the North Caucasus Military District, avoiding Western 
suspicion, and began installing experienced combat veterans in Ossetian and Abkhaz 




Military District with one of Russia’s most notorious combat commanders10. Russian 
fighters were used to shoot down Georgian unmanned reconnaissance drones, and a 
battalion of Russian railroad repair troops was sent to bring the railroad line from 
Sukhumi south to Ochamchire11 into working condition (Popjanevski, 2009; Illiaronov, 
2009; Asmus, 2010). Regarding the railroad repair, Georgian deputy foreign minister 
Grigol Vashadze succinctly noted; “No one needs to bring railway forces into the 
territory of another country unless a military intervention is being prepared” (Cited in 
Asmus, 150). This railroad was used heavily during Abkhaz phase of Russia’s invasion. 
Retired helicopter and fighter pilots with experience in the mountainous Caucasus region 
were recruited back into active military service (Illiaronov, 2009; Asmus, 2010). Both the 
CISPKF and JPKF began receiving unscheduled “reinforcements,” which brought their 
total numbers well above treaty levels (Blandy, 2009; Melek, 2009; Popjanevski, 2009, 
Illiaronov, 2008). The CISPKF in Abkhazia complained loudly to the UNOMIG and 
OSCE observers that Georgia was secretly increasing its forces along the border and in 
the Kodori gorge in preparation for offensive military operations. Though observers were 
unable to find any evidence to support the claim, Russia continued to reinforce above 
                                                 
10 Russian General Vasily Lunev was appointed as South Ossetia’s Minister of Defense, and Colonel-
General Sergey Makarov, “one of the most experienced Russian officers” was appointed as the commander 
of the North Caucasus Military District (Illiaronov, 2009, 67).  A list of Russian officials occupying 
positions of authority within the South Ossetian government, see the EU Independent International Fact 
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Volume III (Tagliavini, 2009c). 
11 The Location of Ochamchire on the southern end of the Abkhaz Black Sea coast would provide an 
excellent staging area for a large-scale invasion force arriving by rail.  The railway repairs were conducted 
under the auspices of modernization for commercial purposes, though the use of Russian regular army 




authorizations (Popjanevski, 2009; Smith, 2009). Moscow was trying to find justification 
for an offensive in Abkhazia, but none could be found. 
In South Ossetia Moscow found more favorable conditions, and began to move in 
heavy artillery and weapons systems beyond what was authorized in the JPKF charter 
(Illiaronov, 2009; Asmus, 2010). Many of these weapons made their way into the hands 
of the South Ossetian militias, which began using them in the summer of 2008, often 
firing on Georgian forces and ethnic enclaves from proximity to, and even directly from 
Russian JPKF posts (Tagliavini, 2009c; Asmus, 2010). The near-civil war in 2004 had 
occurred in South Ossetia, and the main focus of annual summer attacks was also 
between South Ossetian and Georgian forces in Ossetia. 
“KAVKAZ 2008” A Dress-Rehearsal for Invasion 
 On 15 July, 2008, over 1000 U.S. servicemen began a large-scale training 
exercise involving 600 Georgian troops. The exercise, titled “Immediate Response, 
2008”, was designed mostly as a diplomatic measure with tactical goals of preparing 
Georgian forces for further counter-insurgency service as part of the greater coalition 
effort in Iraq. On the same day, across the northern border in Russia, over 8,000 Russian 
troops began their own large-scale exercises, titled “KAVKAZ, 2008”.
12
   
KAVKAZ, 2008 was part of a series of annual counter-terror exercises designed as 
training and certification for Russian MVD troops en-route to duty in neighboring 
Chechnya and Dagestan. KAVKAZ, 2008 was billed as focusing on “resolution of anti-
terror situations”. Further, Russia reported that some of the troops involved were training 
                                                 
12 There is speculation that the 8,000 troop figure for the exercise was a misleading figure downplayed 




and preparing to replace or reinforce the current contingent of Russian peacekeepers in 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia “in light of the fact that recently the situation in the 
Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflict zones has sharply intensified” (Gabuev 
& Dvali, 2008). Given the vast difference in numbers between actual peacekeeping forces 
on the ground, even after Moscow’s unilateral increase, and the numbers involved in the 
KAVKAZ, 2008 exercise, it is difficult to accept Moscow’s premise of peacekeeping 
forces rotations or counter-terror operations as the actual basis of the exercise. The 
Russian 58th Army, the major headquarters involved in KAVKAZ, 2008, as well as the 
actual invasion, brought over 700 pieces of armor, artillery and aviation to bear in the 
exercise, which also involved rehearsals of “a military operation in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia” (Gabuev & Dvali, 2008; Melek, 2009). KAVKAZ, 2008 took place along the 
border areas near the Roki Pass, and once exercises ended on August 2nd, almost the 
entire Russian contingent of 8,000 troops remained in their positions and on high alert 
(Melek, 2009; Allison, 2008). Due to Moscow’s repudiation in 2007 of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty, NATO and western forces were unable to verify the activities 
and operations of Russian forces participating in KAVKAZ, 2008, or to verify the content 
of orders and status of orientation as the troops remained battle-ready even after the end 
of the exercise. 
Between August 2nd and 5th, the South Ossetian government began evacuating 
nearly 20,000 civilians from Tskhinvali, sending them to North Ossetia in Russia, and 
allowing a battlefield generally free of civilians (Illiaronov, 2009). Initially this was done 
to maintain civilian safety should large-scale conflict break out; however the South 
Ossetian government then backtracked, explaining that the evacuation was actually part 
of a leisure camp program and had nothing to do with hostilities (Popjanevski, 2009). 




Tskhinvali with the expectation that they would “cover something big” (Whitmore, 2008; 
Cited in Popjanevski, 2009, 149). Andrei Illiaronov also reported that foreign journalists 
were not allowed into Tskhinvali because of “problems with their documents.” (2008). 
Attacks between the South Ossetian militia and the Georgian police and 
peacekeepers also steadily increased through July and the first week of August, reaching 
levels not seen since 2004. Differences were noted, though, as Ossetian militia was now 
using large-caliber mortars during attacks, and firing from close proximity to, and 
sometimes directly from, Russian peacekeeping positions (Asmus, 2010; Tagliavini, 
2009c). Georgia, recognizing the quickly worsening situation, turned to the West, and 
primarily the United States for help, but found very little. The United States warned 
against any action that might trigger a Russian response, and Saakashvili’s last-ditch 
efforts at diplomacy were being ignored (Popjanevski, 2009; Asmus, 2010). To add to the 
matter, the world’s attention was focused on the Olympic Games in Beijing.  Saakashvili 
pulled his 4th Brigade from GTEP pre-deployment training and began deploying the 
Georgian military to staging areas near South Ossetia (Felgenhauer, 2009; Asmus, 2010). 
After final attempts at diplomacy, including a unilateral cease-fire, Saakashvili ordered 
Georgian forces to assault Tskhinvali at 2330, the night of August 7th.  
While the official EU reports state that Georgia’s midnight invasion of Tskhinvali 
on August 7th triggered the Russian invasion the next day, there are several sources 
which indicate that Russian forces were already in South Ossetia in large numbers as 
early as August 6th (Tagliavini, 2009a,c; Illiaronov, 2009; Asmus, 2010)13. Several 
sources also claim that Saakashvili ordered the move on Tskhinvali not as a move to 
restore constitutional order, but in response to reports of massive Russian armor 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, the EU’s IIFFMCG report is one of those very sources, and despite the report’s own 
evidences that Russian regular forces were in South Ossetia prior to the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali, it 




formations moving through the Roki Tunnel (Illiaronov, 2009; Popjanevski, 2009; 
Asmus, 2010). These reports are in some measure substantiated by Georgian news casts 
on the evening of August 7, which reported on the advance of Russian regular forces 
(Popjanevski, 2009). Though the question of which side actually started the war can be 
debated, in any case, on August 8, Russia and Georgia were at war. 
RUSSIA’S ANSWER TO THE WEST 
As the war began, both sides were acutely aware of the need to control the media 
and the narrative of what was happening. Each side quickly developed its initial story, 
designed to paint the other as the aggressor and garner sympathy and support for their 
actions, both internationally and domestically. For Russia, the primary mission was to 
show that Georgia was the aggressor and that Moscow was not acting, but instead 
reacting to Georgian offenses. As the Georgians had attacked first, Russia claimed it had 
the right to intervene first in defense of its peacekeeping forces, and second in defense of 
its citizens against Russian claims of Georgian human rights violations, invoking the 
2005 UN agreements on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), though R2P specifically 
required UN authorization to act on its basis (Rubin, 2008; Roudik, 2008; Allison, 2008). 
Roy Allison claims that Moscow used this argument as a start point for invoking the 
Kosovo precedent, saying “By presenting the ‘will of the people’ in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as an overriding principle, Russia set itself on a course to recognition of the 
statehood of these regions” (2008, 1154). Because of these two justifying arguments, the 
Russian media claimed that Moscow deserved the support of the international 
community. It was here that the Kremlin invoked the Kosovo precedent and claimed that 




Russia then had a justifiable expectation that the US and NATO would give no serious 
criticism for its actions (Roudik, 2008; Goble, 2009) 
Georgia’s response was just that, a response. As Georgia began the build-up to the 
Tskhinvali offensive and last-ditch diplomatic efforts against large-scale military 
operations, the Georgian government failed to seize the narrative of the operation early 
and made the mistake of giving conflicting reasoning for the operation. As Russia’s 
media narrative took form, Georgia saw the need to respond by challenging Russian 
claims to justification for military intervention. Georgian military operations in South 
Ossetia were a legitimate domestic deployment, and Russia “had violated international 
law by invading a sovereign country” (Goble, 2009, 183)14. More importantly Georgia 
fought against Russian use of international intervention in Kosovo and subsequent 
international recognition of the breakaway republic as a principle for justification. 
Georgia argued that Russia’s use of the Kosovo precedent was counterintuitive, and that 
the same logic Russia was using could be used as an argument for foreign intervention in 
Russia’s Chechnya (Goble, 2009). 
As the war progressed and Georgian forces were pushed out of Tskhinvali, and 
then Russian forces began pushing into Georgia proper the Russian themes began to 
change. Though the initial reaction and protection theme was generally maintained, the 
invasion force was deemed a “reinforced Russian peacekeeping contingent,” but then 
soon the operation became “peace coercion”, a term widely used to justify full-scale war, 
despite the fact that Russia’s peacekeeping charter limited Russian forces “to monitoring 
                                                 
14 The EU IIFFMCG Volume I specifically states that neither South Ossetia nor Abkhazia had legal basis 
for seeking sovereignty, and Russia did not have legal basis for recognition of sovereignty (Tagliavini, 
2009a, 17).  Additionally, the volume addresses Russia’s passport and citizenship drives as illegal as such a 
citizenship drive requires, by international law, consent of the affected country; in this case, Georgia 
(Tagliavini, 2009a, 18).  The report additionally states that Georgia did not have a legal basis for internal 





the ceasefire, with no provision for peace enforcement” (Allison, 2008, 1152). As Russia 
was challenged on the apparent inconsistencies with its own internal policies regarding 
Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to argue that “South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were never used for terrorist attacks on Georgia,” but “Chechnya was a 
springboard for such attacks” (Allison, 2008, 1155), despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary. 
 
Illustration 2: The scheme of Russian and Georgian maneuver during the August 2008 
war.  (Andrei Nacu, from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2008_South_Ossetia_war_en.svg) 
Publicly there was very little mention of the goal of regime change and complete 
destabilization in Georgia, but it seems it was at least an opportunity which Russia would 




quoted as saying he wanted “to hang [Saakashvili] by the balls”. Sarkozy retorted with, 
“Hang him?” Putin then said, “Why not? The Americans hanged Saddam Hussein.”  
Sarkozy replied, “But do you want to end up like Bush?” Putin’s answer, “Ah, there you 
have a point,” (Conversation cited in Asmus, 2010, 199)15. This conversation belies one 
last comparison the Russians were likely seeing; not only did Russia feel a need to 
answer, and even mimic, the West regarding Kosovo, but it is conceivable that after 
observing the U.S. and its various forms of NATO and non-NATO coalitions invade 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Moscow felt that new norms under international law were 
developing regarding the use of force between states. The fact that Putin compared his 
own desires to the actions of the US coalition in Iraq belies what were likely feelings of 
animosity towards the US’s ability to conduct military operations with seeming impunity 
across the globe. 
Several of Russia’s actions during the preparation for and conduct of the war, as 
well as in the years following have given evidence that the war itself was not only the 
culmination of grievances against Georgia, but as a message directed at NATO. The 
message was simply that NATO’s expansion into the former Soviet sphere, unilateral 
aggression outside U.N. authority and beyond the historical regional auspices of NATO, 
would not go on unanswered by Russia. Not willing to be relegated to a subordinate in a 
unipolar world, Russia had to act in a manner both consistent with the perceived actions 
of the U.S. and NATO as well as in complete defiance of the rules which Russia 
perceived the West had arbitrarily placed on the rest of the world.  
                                                 
15 Asmus also recounts a conversation between Russian General Vyacheslav Borisov, commander of the 
Pskov 76th Airborne Division, and Alexander Lomaia, Georgian Secretary of the National Security 
Council, in Gori on August 15th, 2008, during which General Borisov outlined what was possibly Russia’s 





The first of these evidences came as Putin’s warning to Saakashvili in 2008, that 
joining NATO would make Georgia a threat to Russia, as well as Chief of Russia’s 
General Staff General Baluyevsky’s statement that Moscow would take any measures 
necessary to stop Georgia from joining NATO (Asmus, 2010). While these statements 
were indeed hostile to Georgia, Putin’s additional statements are the most revealing that 
the true target of Russia’s hostility was NATO. He said, “we shall respond on Kosovo not 
to you, but the West – America and NATO… What we will do will not be directed 
against you but will be our response to them” (Asmus, 2010, 107). Later, while Western 
leaders were making token efforts toward a diplomatic solution before the war, Russia 
made a deliberate statement against the involvement of the United States in Georgia, 
sending a flight of four fighters into Georgian airspace as U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice was landing (Asmus, 2010). Though it was Georgian airspace which 
had been violated, the hostile statement was directed clearly at the United States. As an 
additional snub, the invasion of Georgia came only days after the conclusion of 
Immediate Response 2008, and there were both American military personnel and 
equipment still in Georgia awaiting transport when the war began16. 
Shortly after the war, during his first State of the Nation speech, Medvedev stated 
that the “conflict in the Caucasus was used as a pretext to bring NATO warships into the 
Black Sea” (2008). However, the clearest evidence that Russia’s invasion was directed 
primarily at NATO and as an answer to the West has come only recently. On November 
21, 2011, during a trip to the Southern Military District17 headquarters in Vladikavkaz, 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said: 
                                                 
16 After Russian Marines captured the port city of Poti, they displayed several armored humvees belonging 
to the U.S. Marine Corps which had been sitting in a loading yard waiting to be shipped to the United 
States.  Russia has refused to return the vehicles. 





Time goes by fast – more than three years have already passed, but what is the 
most important our approaches towards and our assessments of those events have 
not changed. We of course consider that it was absolutely necessary action by our 
army to save large number of our citizens and, if not to remove totally, to curb the 
threat which was coming at the time from the territory of Georgia. “If we had 
faltered in 2008, geopolitical arrangement would be different now and number of 
countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the 
North Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been [in NATO] now. (Whitmore, 
2011; Novosty-Gruziya, 2011) 
 
Medvedev reiterated his point later in the day to a group of reporters, stating: 
We have simply calmed some of our neighbors down by showing them that they 
should behave correctly in respect of Russia and in respect of neighboring small 
states. And for some of our partners, including for the North Atlantic Alliance, it 
was a signal that before taking a decision about expansion of the Alliance, one 
should at first think about the geopolitical stability. I deem these [issues] to be the 
major lessons of those developments in 2008. (Whitmore, 2011) 
During the conduct of the war no mention was given to the idea that Russia 
invaded Georgia to stifle Western expansion and the hopes of Russian near-abroad states 
to join NATO. Now, three years later, Medvedev has begun hinting that this did, indeed, 
play a role in the action. In addition to these statements we can add the Russian 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent nations on August 22nd, 2008, 
which bolsters the idea that Russia viewed the war as its “answer” to the West over the 
lingering wound of Kosovo and perceived changes in international norms created by the 
U.S. relating to justifiable reasons for invading sovereign nations. While relations since 
August, 2008 have normalized to a degree, significant fear arose during the summer of 
2009, when Russia began its military exercises under the name KAVKAZ, 2009 
(Ribakoff, 2009). Many analysts saw similar patterns emerging and predicted a possible 
attempt by Russia to complete its alleged goals of the previous year of Georgian regime 
change and full annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In March, 2010, Georgian 




Tbilisi, sparking panic among the city’s residents (Harding, 2010). It is significant that 
three years after the war there has been no renewed violence between Russian and 
Georgian forces. With the passing of each year another war becomes, hopefully, less and 
less likely.   
While Western behavior was initially cooperative, attitudes and actions through 
the 1990’s soon moved away from cooperation, but did not reach a stage of deliberate 
defection. Instead, Russia was afflicted by a form of dismissive defection, in which the 
West did not act deliberately to deprive Russia of power or influence, but instead acted in 
a manner that simply ignored the possibility that Russia had any power or influence. As 
the West continued its own metamorphosis from a defensive to an offensive entity, it 
continued in its diminutive view of Russia. Cooperation with Russia was not a necessary 
course for the West, as the prospect of Russian defection was no longer worrisome. So, 
the West pressed ahead, raising NATO up as an authoritative equal to the U.N. regarding 
state-on-state military action, expanding both NATO’s membership and charter to 
include former Soviet states and spaces, reducing Russia’s ideological and physical 
buffers, and looking beyond Europe to “out of area” operations. The United States 
overrode international norms by dismissing historical arms control treaties and 
unilaterally invading nations, and developing a missile defense system in spite of Russia. 
Russia understood that even in the post-Soviet world, a form of status-quo would 
be maintained and Russia would continue to be treated as a major world power. When 
this status-quo failed to materialize, Russia was left with deciding on a proper course of 
action and response. Throughout the 1990s, Russia maintained a course of cooperation, 
acting out of the hope that should Russia’s economy and military improve and politics in 
Moscow normalize, the West would return to seeing Russia as the world power it had 




West disappeared as NATO began bombing Kosovo, and Russia acted in defection by 
seizing the Pristina airfield, nearly ending in war. The West, however, was less than 
impressed and instead treated the incident as an annoyance, and not as an indicator of 
Russia’s perceived position. When combined with NATO expansion and the revival of 
the missile defense discussions, Russia likely perceived further Western defection, and 
the transition from a stable defensive world to an instable offensive world dominated by 
an offensively postured West18. 
Whether Russia deliberately began planning for a war against Georgia in the early 
2000s is a matter of speculation. Though some evidence can be interpreted as Moscow 
setting the conditions for the War, the simplest explanation is that Moscow was simply 
setting the conditions for a politically favorable environment in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. In 2006, Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s position that it was “the right of 
[Russia’s] neighbors, the CIS countries, to act independently, both domestically and on 
the international stage.” Even during Putin’s 2007 Munich speech he specifically 
mentions Russia-Georgian relations, saying, “Our army is leaving Georgia, even 
according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our 
Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows.” It was during this year that the Kremlin was 
making its last attempt to help the West understand that Russia would be a major player 
in world politics and global security. Russia’s gambit, though, was still seen by the West 
through condescending eyes, as evidenced by the reaction described by Ronald Asmus 
(2010). Instead of realizing that Moscow was on the brink of taking drastic action to 
regain status, the West viewed Russia as a recidivist Soviet Union, looking not for equal 
                                                 
18 As evidence that NATO’s Kosovo operations represented a major shift in Russian attitudes, a Russian 
military correspondent, Alexander Zhylin, stated “Generals have told me that we must build a monument to 
Clinton because the campaign over Kosovo drastically changed political attitudes here.  Now there is no 




status but a return to lost glory. Russia’s security, whether perceived or real, was at stake. 
Moscow felt that “the maintenance of the world’s respect” (Jervis, 1978, 185) for Russia, 
as well as the maintenance of Russia’s physical territory and economic interests, was 
under a very real threat, and Russia would need to answer in a clear and decisive way. 
The clearest answer was Georgia, as the Caucasus region held a convergence of 
all of Russia’s security woes, as discussed during this chapter’s introduction. A response 
involving Georgia would answer NATO expansion, demonstrate Russia’s capability to 
influence regional politics, counter the supposed hegemony of the United States and 
ensure that no missile defense efforts would spread to the Caucasus. Russia’s condition-
setting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a fortuitous investment, further enabling the 
use of Georgia to counter the West. Whether or not the decision to go to war with 
Georgia had been made in February, 2008, the unilateral Western recognition of Kosovo 
independence certainly set events on the path towards war. Vladimir Putin prefaced his 
warning to Saakashvili that same month by saying, “There is an urgent need to react to 
what has happened in Europe on Kosovo. We are currently thinking how to deal with this 
problem.  You shall remember that we are under huge pressure from the republics of the 
North Caucasus, and we have to answer to their solidarity for Abkhazia.” After the 
weight of the insult and defection that was the Kosovo war and occupation, recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence constituted a defection requiring an answer. At some point 
likely following NATO’s refusal of Georgia, Russia decided that war with Georgia was 
the acceptable course. A limited war with Georgia would, at worst, enact the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the level of discord in the West over 
Georgia’s NATO prospects assured Russia that an international response would likely be 
subdued. At best a war with Georgia would result in the fall of Saakashvili’s government 




influence to Armenia and creating a Russian-dominated Caucasus. In either case, the war 
would be relatively bloodless and the Kremlin would be allowed to show off its 21st 
Century military might, both in size and capabilities. It was perceived that a war with 
Georgia would return a measure of status-quo to Russia’s position in the world, and 





Chapter 6: The Future of NATO-Russia Relations  
Russia’s invasion of Georgia should have been a wake-up call to the West that the 
unipolar world envisioned by Western powers was no longer going to be simply tolerated 
in-stride by the Kremlin. The world had completed its move from a number two world, 
where offensive and defensive motives may have been indistinguishable, but the defense 
held the advantage, to a number one world, where the offense had overtaken the defense 
in advantages. According to Jervis, this number one world is the “doubly dangerous” one 
where the security dilemma is most acute and the possibility of both conflict and arms 
race are most severe. NATO had demonstrated its offensive posture through “out of area” 
operations and aggressive expansion, and the United States had solidified that offensive 
advantage through both retaliatory and preemptive military action in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Russia was now playing by the West’s rules that major power states could 
act militarily and economically against smaller states with impunity. Moscow also now 
understood that it could not afford to wait for Western acceptance of Russia as an equal 
major power nation; instead the Kremlin would act the part for itself in the face of 
reactions from the West.   
Looking from the perspective that the international situation since Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia is that of Jervis’ world number one, we should be concerned at the 
potential for both increased hostility and for future armed conflict involving Russia. 
While a direct major-power war between NATO and a resurgent Russia is highly 
implausible, we cannot deny the potential for proxy conflicts involving either Russian or 
Western forces directly, similar to Georgia. At this moment many of the preexisting 
Russian concerns remain in force, as does Western intransigence on the same issues.  




expand their military-logistical footprint around the world. Western missile defense 
efforts continue generally unabated and Russian opposition has only increased to match.  
Several flashpoints continue to threaten the possibility of cooperation between Russia and 
the West, and a few of these deserve a brief look. 
MOMENTUM TOWARD CONTINUED NATO EXPANSION AND MARGINALIZATION OF 
RUSSIA 
The Kremlin has made no secret of its disapproval of NATO expansion, and as 
we’ve argued in this paper, the issue of continued NATO enlargement was one of the 
overarching reasons for Russia’s war in Georgia. Two years after the war Russia released 
its first military doctrine update, entitled Doctrine 2010. While the previous military 
doctrine, Doctrine 2000, referenced NATO expansion indirectly, as discussed in chapter 
2 of this paper, Doctrine 2010 leaves nothing to interpretation. The very first military 
threat listed in Doctrine 2010 is:  
 
The desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of 
international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member 
countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding 
the bloc. (Sec. 8, p. a) 
This is expanded to include “the deployment (buildup) of troop contingents of 
foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian 
Federation and its allies and also in adjacent waters” (Sec. 8, p. c). Shortly after the 
release of Doctrine 2010, an article in Russia’s Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye 
clarified Russia’s stance on NATO expansion, stating that “admitting new governments 
into the alliance looks less like expanding the democratic field throughout Europe, and 
more like surrounding Russia with a ring of newly-admitted NATO members, ready to 




Aside from admitting Albania, Croatia and Romania, following their successful 
completion of previously-granted MAP requirements in 2009, NATO has not made 
significant moves toward new expansion since 2008, though Russia continues to make 
statements to discourage candidate states to join. Russian rhetoric towards prospective 
NATO expansion will likely increase over the next few years, as several nations continue 
to bid for NATO inclusion, including Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Georgia, Ukraine and possibly Finland. During his comments in November, 2011, Dmitri 
Medvedev reiterated Russia’s commitment to keeping Georgia and Ukraine out of NATO 
(Whitmore, 2011; Novosty-Gruziya, 2011), and Macedonia’s pleas to join are falling on 
deaf or unconcerned ears (Shanker, 2012). Moscow gave Finland a stern warning against 
efforts to join NATO when Russian Army Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov 
spoke in Helsinki. Makarov warned Finland that acceptance into NATO, and even 
cooperation with NATO represented a threat to Russia. Makarov tied Finnish cooperation 
with NATO to support to Georgia, and likened Finnish military maneuvers near the 
Russian border with “’unfriendly’ and ‘aggressive’ actions by Georgia on its own 
territory” (Blank, 2012; Felgenhauer, 2012c). Vladimir Putin warned Finland that 
accession into NATO would cause them to “lose their sovereignty”, and would 
negatively affect relations with Russia (RIA Novosty, 2012). 
Despite Russian warnings against NATO expansion, Georgian President 
Saakashvili remains enthusiastic about Georgia’s chances of being incorporated into the 
alliance. Following NATO’s 2012 summit in Chicago, Illinois, Saakashvili has made 
several comments that Georgia has “very good” and “real” chances of being accepted 
during the next NATO summit (Civil.ge, 2012a, 2012b), which U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stated would be focused on further NATO expansion (RFERL, 2012; 




interview with Russia’s Ekho Moskvi radio station, NATO Secretary General Hans Fogh 
Rasmussen stated that NATO “had long since made the decision that Georgia and 
Ukraine would become members,” based on the decisions of the 2008 Bucharest summit, 
and that “those decisions remain in force” (Rasmussen, 2009b). Regardless, Georgia will 
have an uphill battle to climb even among friends, as the Obama presidency has given 
significantly less support for Georgian NATO membership than the Bush administration, 
and it is unclear how much support Georgia will receive from either a second Obama 
administration or a Romney administration. 
As the next NATO summit approaches, Moscow will likely become more and 
more rhetorically hostile, especially towards Finland, Ukraine19 and Georgia – candidate 
states which directly border Russia. While the prospect of Russian military action against 
Finland is unlikely, action against Georgia is still fully plausible, especially if the 
situation facing Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh were to suddenly worsen20. 
Russia has positioned significant military forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Lavrov, 
2010b), and continues to modernize forces throughout the entire Southern Military 
District21 (McDermott, 2012). Additionally, Stephen Blank argues that Makarov’s 
comments to Helsinki and the Kremlin’s silent consent, when combined with a Russian 
build-up of military equipment and forces in the Western Military District and the Baltic 
Sea, “illustrate that the Baltic region cannot yet be considered beyond security threats” 
(Blank, 2012). The conditions for potential conflict in these two areas are significant, and 
                                                 
19 Russian rhetoric towards the possibility of Ukrainian NATO membership will likely continue, despite 
Ukraine’s 2010 announcement that it would no longer seek membership in NATO.  Ukraine agreed to 
honor existing agreements and continue a cooperative relationship with the alliance, which cooperation will 
be used by Russia to justify hostility. (RIA Novosti, 2010) 
20 Russia’s Kavkaz 2012 exercise is possibly based around a scenario which required Russian regular army 
support to Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. 




Russia will likely look for some measure of Cooperation from the West before softening 
incendiary rhetoric and giving reciprocal Cooperation in return. 
EXTRA-U.N. MILITARY ACTION SINCE THE WAR AND IN THE NEAR FUTURE 
In addition to naming the threat of further NATO expansion, Doctrine 2010 also 
specifically notes NATO’s “endowment with global functions carried out in violation of 
the norms of international law” as a direct military threat to Russia. This is a direct 
reference to the belief that NATO holds equal authority with the U.N. Security Council 
for approving or initiating military action. Additionally, the NATO-directed threats also 
specifically identify “attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions 
and to undermine strategic stability” (Sec 8, p. b). During the first decade of the 21st 
Century, the Kremlin came to understand fully that NATO would not wait for U.N. 
Security Council resolutions or authorization regarding offensive military action. Russia 
felt that NATO had instead come to see itself as being equal with the U.N., granting itself 
the authority to conduct offensive military operations. During a 2011 interview with 
Russia 24, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was asked how he would respond to 
adherents of the ideas of “a series of experts, including some in the United States, [who] 
say that the U.N. is an anachronism and thing of the past, and that such an organization is 
no longer needed. And this because of NATO and its global responsibilities, along with 
other methods of ensuring international security, which are both faster and more 
effective.”  Lavrov answered: 
 
I think that they have not fully analyzed the events of the last ten years, beginning 
with the war in Iraq, which was undertaken without the sanction of the U.N. 
Security Council… In the case of the bombing of Belgrade, they didn’t ask for 
any kind of authorization from either the U.N. or the OSCE… This is precisely 
why a U.N. Security Council resolution on Libya was so important to NATO, 
since they understood that the legitimacy of their one-sided actions would not be 




legitimacy of the U.N., it would be impossible to mobilize the full force of the 
global community for post-conflict restoration in Libya…  
 
Last year, after NATO adopted its new strategic concept, which states that 
members of the alliance will project their forces to any region of the globe 
wherever necessary to protect and preserve peace and security, while at the same 
time respecting international rights and laws, NATO began turning to the U.N.  
Their precedent turned out to be not very successful.  We are taking measures to 
ensure that similar ambiguous NATO mandates do not happen again. (2011c) 
Lavrov’s statements outlines where Russia feels that NATO has gone wrong, with 
several examples. The specific examples relating to Libya require more attention, as they 
demonstrate the evolution and possible future of Russian international cooperation and 
relations regarding NATO and the U.N. 
NATO’s Libya Intervention sets the Stage 
As the “Arab Spring” revolutions progressed across Northern Africa, much of the 
world focused on the popular uprising in Libya, where an Islamist rebellion threatened 
the long-reigning regime of Muammar Gaddafi. As civil war ensued, the U.N. Security 
Council was called on to establish controls and execute its R2P duties and protect 
innocent Libyan civilians.  These included sanctions, an embargo against military trade 
with any party in Libya, and the establishment of a “no-fly zone”. Using vague legalistic 
wording in the Resolutions, NATO began an air campaign in support of the Libyan 
rebels, destroying Gaddafi-loyal forces and infrastructure through air strikes. The United 
States entered as a part of NATO, citing the ambiguous Security Council resolution, and 
became the primary contributor to the air effort supporting Libyan rebels. 
During the above referenced Russia 24 interview, Lavrov spoke harshly of 
NATO’s disregard for established U.N. protocols and the sanctity of Security Council 
resolutions. He said “We believe that the authority of the Security Council has been 




understanding of the resolutions.” Lavrov gave two specific examples of the disregard for 
U.N. resolutions. He said “Resolution 1970 was passed with a consensus, which 
established a full military embargo against the sale of weapons to Libya. It is already 
openly acknowledged that this resolution is being violated.” He continued, “Weapons 
were sent from European countries and from Arab countries, and instructors definitely 
worked there on the ground. Western press sources have reported, and no one has yet to 
deny, that special operations forces worked alongside these trainers, that is people who 
helped to plan and participated in combat operations.” 
Lavrov’s second example relates to Resolution 1973 which established a “no-fly 
zone” over Libya to prevent the Gaddafi regime from using air power against peaceful 
popular protests. This resolution contained a paragraph which authorized any government 
the right to use whatever means necessary to enforce the “no-fly zone” and protect the 
population. Russia, along with several other nations, was skeptical of legal ambiguities in 
this portion of the resolution, and abstained from voting for the resolution. The resolution 
received the requisite ten votes, and since Russia did not use its veto, the resolution 
passed. Lavrov said, “our worries were realized – the actions of NATO and Arab combat 
aviation neither enforced the ‘no-fly zone’ or ensured the safety of the population, but 
instead became air support for rebel combat operations” (2011c). Moscow would soon 
put the lessons learned from the Libyan resolutions to work as the Arab Spring continued. 
Russia and NATO Face Off over Intervention in the Syrian Civil War  
In March, 2011, the Arab Spring spread to Syria, where popular demonstrations 
against the regime of Bashir Assad gathered momentum and then boiled over into an 
armed uprising after the Syrian army committed several massacres in trying to subdue the 




first major offensive against the newly formed Free Syrian Army, throwing the country 
into a full civil war. As Syria descended into chaos, the major players in the world were 
taking sides in the conflict. The Kremlin is a historic supporter of Assad and Syria, 
maintaining open relations, lucrative military and arms contracts and a Russian naval 
supply port in the Syrian city of Tartus (Arkhipov, 2012). From the beginning of U.N. 
Security Council discussions on Syria, Russia has opposed serious action against the 
Assad regime, and has used the U.N. proceedings on Libya as their precedent. Because 
NATO used the ambiguity of resolutions on Libya to justify military action, Russia was 
no longer going to simply abstain from voting, but would instead use their veto power 
against any resolution which could be interpreted as justifying military action.  In an 
interview with Bloomberg in June, 2011, Lavrov stated: 
 
First of all, the situation doesn’t present a threat to international peace and 
security… Second, Syria is a very important country in the Middle East, and 
destabilizing Syria would resonate far beyond its borders… We do not see any 
threat to international peace and security, but if we were to get involved in Syria’s 
internal affairs, it could have very serious consequences for the Middle East. 
Lavrov added that “it is not in the interests of anyone to send messages to the 
opposition that if you reject all reasonable offers, we will come and help you, like we did 
in Libya,” and that such a message would be “very dangerous.” 
Russia directly used their Security Council veto to deny two resolutions which 
condemned Assad and declared his regime as illegitimate. The Kremlin was especially 
concerned with this resolution and how widely it could be interpreted and used to justify 
foreign intervention, primarily in opposition to an “illegitimate” Assad regime (Voice of 
Russia, 2011). Moscow continued to support the Syrian government against Western 
attempts at pressure and sanctions through the Security Council, and once used their veto 




Russia, 2011). Russian statements against the regime have become harsher, as the 
situation continues. 
With U.N. resolutions clearly denying any military involvement, Western 
countries have begun supporting the Syrian opposition with humanitarian aid and some 
military-grade communications systems, but have kept clear of direct military support 
(Schmitt, 2012; Totten, 2012; Solomon & Nour, 2012). Politically, the West continues to 
give tacit support to the opposition, and to condemn the Assad regime, calling on Assad 
to step down. Additionally, the West has continued to press for a resolution authorizing a 
“no-fly zone” over Syria, similar to resolution 1973 for Libya. Russia has continued to 
oppose establishing a no-fly zone, for fear that it would justify combat air operations in 
support of the opposition (Middle East Online, 2011; Reuters, 2012). Moscow is also 
pressing for a condemnation of both sides’ violence, while giving preferential support to 
Assad, and continuing arms sales and shipments to the Syrian government (AFP, 2012).   
While the situation on the ground in Syria has continued to worsen, with the civil 
war increasing in intensity, the global political situation has recently taken several turns 
for the worse. Recently the Kremlin began preparing several combat units from Pskov 
and the Southern Military District for foreign deployment. The exact nature of the foreign 
deployments is speculative, but there is a distinct possibility that Moscow is preparing to 
provide direct military support to the established Syrian government (Konovalov, 2012; 
Felgenhauer, 2012b). Moscow also recently dispatched a small flotilla from the Black 
Sea Fleet, including three amphibious transports, each with 120 marines, to the 
Mediterranean, in the vicinity of the port in Tartus. Initially Moscow had claimed the 
marines were sent in case Russia needed to protect its citizens, but then quickly denied 





The West, for its part, is trying to make the political case for Libyan-style military 
intervention, arguing that direct Western involvement on the behalf of the rebels would 
be beneficial for the West (Totten, 2012). While American support for the rebels has been 
muted, President Barack Obama recently authorized clandestine intelligence support, 
designed to determine which opposition groups to support, which supposedly aided in 
steering arms to rebels throughout Syria (Labott, 2012; Schmitt, 2012). Additionally, 
Obama has authorized a Syrian rebel proxy group in the United States to provide 
financial support to the rebels, enabling the purchase of arms from other countries 
(Labott, 2012). In early August, 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced 
that the United States and Turkey were considering the feasibility of imposing a no-fly 
zone, among other options, in order to assist the opposition (Al Salchi, 2012). President 
Obama moved another step closer to the possibility of military support, stating that it 
would be a “red line” for the United States if Syria were to use or move their chemical 
weapons.  Crossing this red line would lead to “enormous consequences,” and could lead 
to unilateral Western military intervention (Associated Press, 2012; Griffin 2012).  
The potential for conflict between Russia and the West in Syria is great. Were the 
port facilities at Tartus to be attacked by rebels, Russia would undoubtedly seize the 
opportunity to reinforce or recapture its strategic facility, and possibly use the event as 
justification for large-scale anti-opposition military intervention. Were NATO to 
unilaterally impose a no-fly zone or begin providing arms or advisers, Russia would feel 
compelled to act to counter NATO, possibly in the form of improved air defense systems 
for the Syrian government. The key component to the potential for conflict between 
Russia and the West lies primarily in the Western penchant for acting outside the the 
U.N. Moscow will not allow a Security Council resolution which could justify 




Russia has been content to continue working within the framework of the U.N. The 
discussions between the United States and Turkey, however, show that the West is not 
content with working for consensus within the U.N. framework. Without the previous 
Defection from NATO in Libya, Russia would likely be more willing to grant 
Cooperation. 
Iran and the Potential for Destabilization of the Caucasus 
The potential for conflict in Syria is indirectly tied to another potential hot spot – 
Iran.  Early draft U.N. resolutions and reports condemned Iran for aiding the Syrian 
government, and Russia was quick to deny any support to those documents as well 
(Reuters, 2011; Voice of Russia, 2011). It could logically be argued that a Western-Israeli 
attack on Iran would have serious effects in Syria, and vice-versa for intervention 
supporting Syrian rebels. Like Syria, Iran has close political and economic ties to Russia, 
and Russia enjoys large-scale arms and defense contracts with Iran. Additionally, Russia 
has provided significant assistance to Iran’s civilian nuclear power programs. Russia has 
remained supportive of Iranian rights under the U.N. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) to develop a peaceful nuclear power program. Unilateral Western action to stop an 
unproven effort to develop nuclear weapons constitutes a dually illegal action on the 
world stage, with the first violation being that of acting without authorization from the 
U.N. Security Council, and the second being the violation of rights guaranteed under the 
NPT. In 2007, Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Yuri Ushakov clearly stated Russia’s 
position when he stated that Moscow supports “the right of Iranians to pursue peaceful 
nuclear energy and opposes the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Most important, we 
believe that the solution should be reached through negotiations with Tehran and not 




As political rhetoric against Iran has grown more hostile in 2012, Russia has 
warned the West against acting unilaterally against Iran. In January, 2012, Russia’s 
Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin warned, “Iran is our close neighbor, just south 
of the Caucasus. Should anything happen to Iran, should Iran get drawn into any political 
or military hardships, this will be a direct threat to our national security” (Quoted in 
NewsInfo.ru, 2012). In the face of potential for airstrikes against Iranian nuclear 
facilities, Russia moved forward with a plan to upgrade Iran’s air defenses by providing 
the S-300 system, but cancelled the deal after the U.N. imposed sanctions against Iran in 
late 2010 (BBC, 2010; Arkhipov, 2012). There is some speculation, though, that were 
Assad’s regime to fall in Syria, Russia would go ahead with selling S-300s to Iran 
(Arkhipov, 2012). Russia is possibly using a potential Western war with Iran as a large 
portion of the scenario for KAVKAZ 2012, stating, “several post-Soviet South Caucasus 
countries would likely be dragged into a potential war against Iran” (Konovalov, 2012a). 
KAVKAZ 2012 is scheduled for September, 2012, which could indicate that Moscow 
preparing for a possible October Israeli strike. 
The Future of Georgia and the Caucasus 
While direct Russian involvement in a conflict in Iran is doubtful, the additional 
scenarios involved in KAVKAZ 2012 indicate that Russia’s plans are instead for the 
Southern Caucasus. The “post-Soviet countries” alluded to in the previous paragraph are 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia maintains peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have recently been very tense, with 
several small clashes (Al Jazeera, 2012). Armenia, historically friendly to Russia, has 
been leaning more towards NATO, participating in NATO exchanges and exercises 




and Russia’s demonstrated hostility against this possibility, Moscow could use the 
opportunity of a Western war against Iran to justify military action across the Southern 
Caucasus (Felgenhauer, 2012a). Russian intervention on behalf of Armenia in Nagorno-
Karabakh, while seemingly beneficial to Armenia, could be used to stamp out any 
inclinations Armenia might have towards NATO cooperation or partnership. Any Iranian 
conflict would likely spill into Azerbaijan’s south as well, and Russia would need to 
ensure the protection of Caspian oil fields, in addition to the possible resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Finally, any military action in Armenia or Azerbaijan would 
necessitate seizing the Eastern half of Georgia to ensure freedom of movement for 
Russian forces. Any large-scale Russian military movements would most likely come 
from Vladikavkaz via South Ossetia and through Tbilisi. Since it is highly unlikely that 
Tbilisi would allow Russian military movements through Georgia, Russia would have to 
cut its way through to Armenia (Felgenhauer, 2012b). 
Since the 2008 war, relations have remained tense between Russia and Georgia, 
with no official diplomatic relations existing between the two nations, and an atmosphere 
of suspicion and hostility remaining. As discussed in the previous chapter, fears 
surrounded the KAVKAZ 2009 exercises, during which Russian soldiers were given the 
same pamphlet as the previous year, describing their opposing force as the Georgian 
Army (Ribakoff, 2009). In March 2010 the state-run television station Imedi TV ran 
reports that the Russian Army had again invaded and was moving on Tbilisi, sparking 
panic throughout the capital city (Harding, 2010). Though the reports were a hoax, the 
panic which ensued was indicative of the atmosphere in Georgia, even two years after the 
2008 war. In late August 2012 a group of 20 heavily-armed individuals crossed the 
Georgia-Russia border from Dagestan and took nearly 10 local Georgians hostage. 




one, and losing three Georgian special policemen. The Russian Border Service denied 
that the group came from Russia, calling the charges a “provocation”, though five of the 
12 killed, and the one captured individual were Russian citizens, and Dagestani officials 
confirmed that the group had originated in Dagestan (RIA Novosti, 2012h; Pik.tv, 2012; 
Vertanyan & Herszenhorn, 2012). In order to avoid possible misconceptions, Georgia 
notified Russia of the operation in advance through the Swiss embassy, though Georgian 
President Mikhail Saakashvili opined the possibility that the group had been sent across 
to test Georgia’s response capabilities, but stopped short of directly implicating Russia 
(RIA Novosti, 2012g; Innokentniy, 2012; Vertanyan & Herszenhorn, 2012). 
There are still several hotspots with the conditions and potential for future direct 
conflict involving Russia. While it is highly unlikely that any of these hotspots would see 
direct Russia-NATO hostilities, proxy conflicts would certainly erupt. The current 
situation extending from the Southern Caucasus and into the northern Middle East is 
definitely perilous.  Avoiding future conflict will require Western recognition22 of 
Russia’s security dilemma and those factors which continue to aggravate that dilemma. 
NATO  MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO THREATEN RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR 
DETERRENT 
The third distinct NATO-focused military threat outlined in Doctrine 2010 is “the 
creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability 
and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also 
the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision 
weapon systems” (Sec. 8, p. d). Doctrine 2010 adds to the missile defense issue with the 
threat of “violation of international accords by individual states, and also noncompliance 
                                                 
22 A critical note is that the West must recognize Russia’s security dilemma, though recognition does not 
necessarily imply acceptance.  The West must be able to understand Russia’s perceptions and points of 




with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms limitation and 
reduction” (Sec. 8, p. f). With Russia’s Doctrine 2010 based solidly on Russia’s nuclear 
deterrent, it is understandable that Russia’s opposition to a Western missile defense 
shield would remain strong, and that suspicions against such a shield persist. As 
discussed in chapter four, Russia does not accept NATO’s justification for continuing 
development of missile defense systems, and continues to see any NATO or United 
States-led European missile defense system as directed at Russia (RIA Novosti, 2012d, e, 
f). In November 2008 President Medvedev even stated that the War in Georgia had been 
used “to impose an American anti-missile defense system on Europe.” 
Where much of the missile defense initiative was created and put into effect by 
the Bush Administration, the Obama administration began with the idea of a relations 
“reset” with Russia (Cooper, 2009). This included a softer stance on European missile 
defense.  The initial Polish and Czech sites for the interceptors and radars were ratified by 
the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic in late 2008, prior to the end of the 
Bush presidency. In November, 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced 
that Russia would deploy SS-2623 “Iskander” missiles to Kaliningrad, located between 
Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea, and well within range of the planned Polish 
interceptor sites (Medvedev, 2008; RIA Novosti, 2008). Throughout Obama’s 
presidential campaign he asserted support for missile defenses, so long as the technology 
was “workable”, but shortly after his election, Obama’s foreign policy adviser, Dennis 
McDonough stated that Obama had made “no commitment” that the United States would 
continue its agreement to base missile defense assets in Poland (BBC, 2008). In early 
2009 President Obama announced that missile defense efforts should be continued “as 
                                                 




long as the threat from Iran persists” and continued to superficially support the idea of 
missile defenses. In September 2009 the American position changed when the Obama 
administration cancelled the Polish and Czech-based missile defense assets (Baker, 
2009a). In its place a smaller, lower-key effort for future European deployment “possibly 
in Poland or the Czech Republic” was announced (Baker, 2009a; 2009b).   
Russia’s response to the announcement was cautious, as Moscow remained 
skeptical that any European missile defense plan was not aimed against it. Through 2010 
NATO officials began making efforts towards coordinating a NATO-U.S.-Russian 
missile defense solution, in order to “demonstrate that missile defense is not against 
Russia, but to protect Russia” (Quoted in Hildreth & Ek, 2011, p.5). Russia was invited to 
NATO’s 2010 Lisbon summit in hopes that greater cooperation could be achieved.  The 
summit resulted in a NATO-led European territorial missile defense system, endorsed by 
the Kremlin and with the assistance of Russian technicians. At the 2010 Munich Security 
Conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the Lisbon agreements 
“encouraging,” but warned “possible cooperation on Missile Defense in no way means 
that Russia wittingly agrees to accede to the NATO programme developed without 
Russia“ (2011a). 
The United States has pressed ahead with its own initiatives, as outlined by the 
Obama administration, instead of going along with the Euro-based missile defense 
system agreed to in Lisbon. This has created tension between the United States and 
Russia, and has led to increasingly hostile rhetoric from the Kremlin. In November 2011, 
President Medvedev made a special televised declaration to address the “complicated 
situation surrounding anti-ballistic-missile defenses in NATO countries.” In this address 
Medvedev lambasted the United States for developing missile defenses in spite of the 




“placate” Russia. “We will not agree,” said Medvedev, “to take part in any program 
which will, over a relatively short timeframe, weaken our potential for deterrence.” 
Medvedev outlined several national decisions, including activating early warning radar 
sites in Kaliningrad, hardening of Russian strategic nuclear sites, targeting of BMD sites 
by Russian strategic rocket forces, the development of measures to defeat BMD 
information and control systems, and as a final measure, the deployment of offensive 
weaponry, capable of physical destruction of BMD sites. Much like Putin’s 2007 Munich 
speech, this speech to the Russian people was meant for NATO ears, and was a warning 
that Western missile defense plans and activities were aggravating Russia’s security 
dilemma.  Cooperation, equality and openness were the solution; a position reiterated by 
General Makarov in early 2012 (RIA Novosti, 2012a). Makarov warned, as well, that 
positioning offensive weaponry to be able to destroy BMD sites was necessary, and that 
“a decision to preemptively use these [weapons] would be taken, should the situation 
become more strained” (RIA Novosti, 2012b). 
During NATO’s 2012 summit in Chicago, NATO reiterated its positions on 
missile defense and its commitment to Obama’s plan of phased implementation. Russia’s 
NATO representative, Nikolai Korchunov reaffirmed Moscow’s position that Western 
missile defenses in Europe could only be seen as a threat to Russia, saying “the 
contradiction between stated policies [of reliance on both missile defenses and nuclear 
deterrence] only serves to increase Russian concerns about the true U.S./NATO agenda 
behind the BMD deployments in Europe and other parts of the world.” He continued, 
“Even the limited current deployments of missile-defense elements are worrying for 
Russia. The proposed BMD base in Poland, housing increasingly capable SM-3 





Despite the continued suspicion and hostility, Moscow remains rhetorically 
dedicated to the idea of missile defense cooperation, so long as the solution is beneficial 
to Russia. Until such a solution is devised, Russia will continue to believe that European 
missile defenses are directed at Russia, and that the threat of Iranian or non-state nuclear 
missiles are simply a guise to continue working toward an operational missile defense 
system. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION AND EASING THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
Despite the many problems, there are still areas where Russia and NATO are 
cooperating well. Russia has, since its beginnings, supported the American and NATO 
efforts in Afghanistan. A number of the militants operating in the Caucasus were tied, 
directly and indirectly, to Al-Qaida’s leadership operating out of the mountainous Eastern 
Afghanistan and Pakistani tribal areas. Russia has allowed NATO to move supplies by 
ground and air to Afghanistan, since 2008, which has been especially useful in times 
when the traditional logistical routes in Pakistan were closed (Marmon, 2010). This 
secondary supply route is both more expensive and takes longer, but NATO supplies 
aren’t subject to attacks as they are in Pakistan. In June 2012 the Russian State Duma 
voted to allow NATO an aerial logistics hub in Ulyanovsk, Russia (RIA Novosti, 2012e). 
Despite stipulations that the hub only be used to transport non-lethal supplies, and that it 
remain under Russian control, it is a promising agreement which could lead to greater 





                
Illustration 3: The Southern NATO supply route (left) and the Northern NATO supply 
route (right).  (Images courtesy Marmon, 2012) 
 







Figure 3:  Residents of Ulyanovsk protest the proposed NATO hub.  The sign reads 
“NATO has surrounded us with bases, and we have disarmed ourselves.” 
(RIA Novosty, Lyiubov Chilikova) 
Still, there are many in Russia who are at best suspicious, and at worst openly 
hostile to the Ulyanovsk agreement. General Major Alexander Vladimirov, a member of 
Russia’s National Strategic Council argued heavily against the NATO hub, complaining 
that it was “the first time since the existence of the Russian Federation, Russian Empire, 
and Soviet Union and indeed on the territory of Russia that a military presence has been 
established by an antagonistic military-political bloc.” General Vladimirov then posited 
that the Ulyanovsk hub is actually among the first steps in an American plan to “prepare 
the conditions for a theater of war”, comparing the supply hub to the Pristina airfield 
seized by Russian paratroopers, ready for NATO to land its “own divisions of 
paratroopers,” or surmising that NATO aircraft would use the opportunity to airdrop 
surveillance equipment, drugs, or even to poison the Volga (2012). While General 




espouses such ideas indicates that there is still a healthy suspicion of the West throughout 
Russia, and the fact that Russian citizens protested the NATO hub prior to its ratification 






The collapse of the Soviet Union presented a unique opportunity for Russia and 
the West to move past their antagonistic past towards partnership and a future of 
cooperation. Both Russia and the West recognized that the world had changed 
dramatically, though each side viewed the changed state of the world in entirely different 
terms. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the West, led by the United States and NATO, 
drove an optimistic, yet guarded and wounded Russia deep into a security dilemma.  
Western rhetoric promised Russia cooperation, partnership and security, but Western 
action showed condescension, isolation and disregard. The security dilemma felt by 
Russia was acute; Russia remained the second largest nuclear power in the world, the 
largest nation by landmass, and still held a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, 
yet it was being treated as banana republic and a relic of a by-gone era. Finally, Russia’s 
security dilemma culminated in 2008 with the invasion of Georgia; a military operation 
conducted to prevent continued expansion of NATO, answer the West’s disregard for 
U.N. authority and use of unilateral military aggression, and to keep Western missile 
defenses out of the Caucasus. 
The Cold War world was characterized by Jervis’ security dilemma as a number 
two world – one where offensive and defensive posturing were difficult to distinguish or 
discern, but defense held the advantage. This second world retained the security dilemma, 
but since defense held the advantage, agreements could be made to satisfy the dilemma of 
each competitor state. Thus, the West and the Soviet Union balanced each other out via 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and numerous strategic and conventional arms treaties.  
During the 10-15 year period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number two 




relatively indistinguishable, but the offense had replaced defense as the advantageous 
action, as demonstrated by NATO and Western unilateral military aggression. Moscow 
saw NATO expansion as encircling Russia and reducing strategic buffer zones, and 
missile defense initiatives as reducing Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Each of these 
actions, while ostensibly taken in the name of “defense” constituted an aggregate offense 
against Russia, by the West. 
Because of the nature of the “frozen” separatist conflicts in Georgia, the strategic 
nature of the Caucasus region, and the presence of all three major components of 
Russia’s security dilemma in the Caucasus, Moscow undertook to answer perceived 
Western aggression there. While some blame for the August 2008 war can be placed on 
Georgia, Russia’s thorough preparation for conflict belies not only anticipation, but 
premeditation for hostilities with Georgia. After the war, Western attitudes toward 
Moscow eased, especially accounting for President Obama’s “Russian relations reset”, 
and reduced Western support for Georgia. Still, NATO continues to eye further 
expansion and Georgia continues to press for admission into the alliance, NATO and the 
West continue to see their military capabilities as indicative of authority for their use as 
demonstrated in Libya, and NATO is continuing to press forward with a United-States-
designed European missile defense system which excludes Russian input. Each of the 
security indicators perceived by Russia continues today, and the potential for renewed 
hostilities between Western and Russian interests remains. Since the War, Russia has 
remained diplomatic about expressing grievances, and the West is more apt to work 
diplomatically with Russia. Despite the issues which complicate Russia’s security 
dilemma, Russian-Western cooperation on issues of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, 




This thesis has examined the three major areas of concern which led to Russia’s 
acute security dilemma – marginalization of Russia and NATO expansion, unilateral and 
extra U.N. military operations, and missile defense initiatives – and how each area has 
led to Russia’s perception of western Defection. This thesis has also discussed the context 
of Russia’s relationship with Georgia, the Caucasus and why Georgia became the subject 
of the culmination of Russia’s security dilemma, as well as evidences that the August 
2008 war was, in fact, a message directed at the West. Finally each area of concern has 
been examined, along with how there is still considerable concern, as Western actions 
continue to complicate Russia’s security dilemma, and could lead to a new conflict.  
If the West is to avoid this conflict, it must examine the nature of its actions and 
relationships with the world at large. What is NATO’s role in the 21st Century, and what 
is the purpose of continued NATO expansion? NATO must clearly define and justify 
expansion, especially to those “buffer” states which border Russia, and ensure Russian 
objections are rationally addressed. Regardless of its deficiencies, the U.N. remains the 
globally-recognized legal authority for security and diplomatic matters and the West must 
use the U.N. Security Council venue to make the case for future military action. Lastly, 
the West must make the case for missile defense systems. If there is not a logical and 
legitimate reason for excluding Russia from a global missile defense system, Russia will 
continue to be justified in perceiving it as a threat to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Given the 
threats Western missile defenses are directed against, including Russia as a full partner 
makes incredible sense. The West needs to collectively reevaluate its positions regarding 
Russia, the assumptions and history behind those positions, and the logical conclusion 
towards which those positions are leading. The West, whether they like it or not, will 
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